Indian Country and the Territory Clause: Washington\u27s Promise at the Framing by Dossett, John Hayden
American University Law Review 
Volume 68 Issue 1 Article 4 
2018 
Indian Country and the Territory Clause: Washington's Promise at 
the Framing 
John Hayden Dossett 
Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr 
 Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the United States 
History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dossett, John Hayden (2018) "Indian Country and the Territory Clause: Washington's Promise at the 
Framing," American University Law Review: Vol. 68 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol68/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews 
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
American University Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington 
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
Indian Country and the Territory Clause: Washington's Promise at the Framing 
This article is available in American University Law Review: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol68/
iss1/4 
 205 
INDIAN COUNTRY  
AND THE TERRITORY CLAUSE:  
WASHINGTON’S PROMISE AT THE FRAMING 
JOHN HAYDEN DOSSETT* 
This Article explores the Territory Clause, Article IV, Section 3, as a source of 
power for federal laws in “Indian country,” as defined at 18 U.S.C § 1151.  In 
contrast to plenary power doctrine, the Territory Clause offers a textual source of 
authority to regulate matters unrelated to commerce, such as criminal 
jurisdiction, in Indian country.  Intended to constitutionalize the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, the Territory Clause provides a principled rather than 
plenary basis for congressional initiatives in Indian policy and a constitutional 
source of authority tempered by the duty of “utmost good faith.”  This renewed 
understanding of the Territory Clause makes certain the source of federal 
authority in Indian country, and provides a stronger interpretive lens for 
matters of tribal sovereignty, land rights, taxation, and criminal justice. 
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I would only observe; . . . that the Tribes of Indians within our 
Territory are numerous, soured and jealous; that Communications 
must be established with the exterior Posts; And, that it may be policy 
and economy, to appear respectable in the Eyes of the Indians, at 
the Commencement of our National Intercourse and Traffic with 
them. 
—George Washington1 
INTRODUCTION 
A.    The Problem of Plenary Power in Federal Indian Law 
The federal government comprehensively regulates indigenous 
peoples in the United States, as well as fifty-seven million acres of tribal 
lands, an area larger than Idaho.2  In this area defined as the “Indian 
country,” the Department of Justice enforces a unique federal criminal 
code found at Chapter 53 of Title 18 of the United States Code. The 
Department of the Interior’s expansive authority is evident in Title 25 
of the United States Code, covering subjects as varied as tribal 
government organization, tribal courts, civil rights, law enforcement, 
Indian health care, education, housing, cultural resources, land titles 
and records, probate, agriculture, forestry, and mining.3  In recent 
decades, federal policy has become less paternalistic, supporting tribal 
self-determination and empowering tribal governments to take greater 
control and responsibility within their homelands.4  
Tribal self-government has many benefits, but also raises new legal 
questions that seemed long settled.  If the federal government has 
limited powers under the Constitution, where does it derive its 
authority to enact such comprehensive laws related to Indian tribes 
and native peoples?  The Supreme Court has historically deferred to 
Congress on this question, devising a theory of plenary authority that 
resulted in great loss of tribal lands and rights during the nineteenth 
                                               
 1. George Washington’s Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, 1 May 1783, FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11202.  
 2. See DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INDIAN TRUST 
ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM 16 (2013) (“On trust lands . . . [the Department of the 
Interior (DOI)] is responsible for managing [fifty-six] million surface acres and [fifty-
seven] million acres of subsurface mineral estates . . . .”). 
 3. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1–5636 (2012). 
 4. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, id. §§ 5301–
5423, is the primary example but there are many others, including the Indian Health 
Care Improvement Act, id. §§ 1601–1683, the HEARTH Act, id. § 415(h), and the 
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211 (2010). 
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and early twentieth centuries.5  More recently, seemingly in reaction to 
federal laws that restore tribal rights, some members of the Court and 
Congress are inclined to limit federal power to its enumerated sources 
and have questioned whether Congress has any power in Indian affairs 
other than the regulation of commerce.6  Questions regarding the sources 
of federal authority in Indian affairs pose a new challenge within the field. 
The purpose of this Article is to begin a reexamination of textual sources. 
Federal authority in Indian affairs is customarily traced to two 
sources in the Constitution.  First, Article I’s Commerce Clause 
empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”7  This clause 
recognizes the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes similar to that of 
states and foreign nations.  Congress’s three powers—over foreign 
commerce, interstate commerce, and Indian commerce—have different 
applications, but were all “given in the same words, and in the same 
breath, as it were.”8  Although federal power over commerce and trade 
with Indian tribes is very broad, it is doubtful that it extends to subjects 
such as criminal jurisdiction or civil rights. 
Second, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, commonly known 
as the Treaty Clause, gives the President the power “to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”9  The Supreme 
Court has said that a treaty is “primarily a compact between independent 
                                               
 5. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (maintaining that 
Congress continuously exercised plenary authority over tribal relations); Cherokee 
Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902) (“The power existing in Congress to 
administer upon and guard the tribal property, and the power being political and 
administrative in its nature, the manner of its exercise is a question within the province 
of the legislative branch to determine, and is not one for the courts.”); Stephens v. 
Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488 (1899) (reaffirming the constitutionality of 
congressional authority to determine citizenship within Indian tribes because tribal 
lands are public and not held by individuals). 
 6. Compare Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2567 (2013) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (reflecting upon the inadequacy of relying on congressional authority 
under the Indian Commerce Clause when the claim involved neither Indian tribes nor 
commerce, but instead included “noneconomic activity such as adoption of children”), 
with White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (“Congress has 
broad power to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause . . . .”). 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) 
(remarking upon the breadth of the Commerce Clause, which simultaneously provides 
Congress with the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the states, 
and with Indian tribes). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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nations.”10  Although the Treaty Clause does not specifically reference 
Indian tribes, hundreds of Indian treaties were established between 
the United States and Tribal Nations,11 and President Washington 
insisted that the Senate ratify Indian treaties in the same manner as 
foreign treaties.12  In 1871, Congress signaled it would no longer ratify 
Indian treaties, ending the nearly 100-year-old practice, and would 
instead unilaterally regulate Indian affairs by statute.13 
Neither the Commerce Clause nor the Treaty Clause provides 
federal authority for the types of intrusive legislation that followed the 
end of the treaty-making period.  In that era, the Supreme Court 
developed a new federal authority in Indian affairs:  a “plenary” power 
drawn from sources outside the text of the Constitution.14  Beginning 
in 1886 with United States v. Kagama15 and running to United States v. 
Lara16 in 2004, a long series of Supreme Court decisions synthesized 
congressional authority over Indian affairs into a nearly unlimited authority.  
Such authority was based on a guardian-ward relationship between the 
federal government and the Indian tribes, as well as the “preconstitutional 
powers necessarily inherent in any Federal Government.”17 
Professor Nell Newton traced the history of federal authority in 
Indian affairs in her seminal work, focusing on the development of the 
plenary power doctrine.18  Plenary power developed as a form of 
deference to Congress and as justification for nineteenth century laws 
taking tribal lands and interfering with tribal rights of self-government.  
Newton concluded that the original reasons for the doctrine are no 
longer applicable, as the country has been settled and notions of racial 
inferiority have been repudiated.19  Nevertheless, federal courts continue 
                                               
 10. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). 
 11. See generally 2 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS:  LAWS AND TREATIES (1904). 
 12. Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate, 17 September 
1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-
04-02-0032 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 13. Indian Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified 
at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012)) (stating that “[n]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory 
of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, 
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty”). 
 14. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 5.01, at 383–91 
(Nell Newton Jessup ed., 2012). 
 15. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 16. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 17. Id. at 201. 
 18. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians:  Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1984). 
 19. Id. at 236. 
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to rely on plenary power or invocations of similarly broad authorities not 
enumerated in the text of the Constitution.20  Professor Phil Frickey captured 
both the legal and ethical concerns with plenary power:   
Its apparent inconsistency with the most fundamental of 
constitutional principles—the McCulloch understanding that 
Congress ordinarily possesses only that authority delegated to it in 
the Constitution—is an embarrassment of constitutional theory. . . .  
Its holding, which intimates that congressional power over Indian 
affairs is limitless, is an embarrassment of humanity.21 
Now that Congress is enacting laws that support tribal self-
government, some members of the Supreme Court question 
Congress’s authority to do so.  Justice Thomas has led these efforts, 
raising sharp concerns with plenary power in a series of concurrences 
and dissents to Indian law decisions.  Justice Thomas’ efforts began in 
2004, with a concurrence in Lara, which was the Court’s third decision 
to grapple with determining the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction.22 
First, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,23 the Court found tribal 
governments implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.24  A decade later in Duro v. Reina,25 the Court found tribes 
divested of criminal jurisdiction over members of another Indian 
tribe.26  After tribal leaders raised significant public safety concerns, 
Congress promptly overturned Duro, amending the Indian Civil Rights 
Act.27  The Act restored “the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby 
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
                                               
 20. Id. at 240. 
 21. Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 35 
(1996) (footnote omitted); see also Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy 
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 163 (2002). 
 22. 541 U.S. 193, 214 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 23. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 24. Id. at 210 (saying the United States’ sovereignty meant Indians relinquished the 
power to try non-Indian citizens except in a manner Congress would have approved). 
 25. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
 26. Id. at 685–86 (determining that the sovereignty to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over members of other Indian tribes was inconsistent with the retained 
sovereignty of Indian tribes because Indian sovereignty had become internal, focused 
on managing and maintaining their respective customs and order). 
 27. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II–VII, §§ 201–701, 82 Stat. 77 (1968).  See generally 
Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564, 1581–
89 (2016) (discussing the prevalent issue of violent crime within Indian tribes due to 
the absence of consistent criminal jurisdiction and the resulting momentum towards 
the 2010 Tribal Law and Order Act). 
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Indians.”28  Fourteen years later, in Lara, the Court upheld this “Duro 
fix” in the face of a double jeopardy challenge where Lara faced both 
tribal and federal prosecution.29  Justice Breyer’s majority opinion 
found no double jeopardy because Tribal Nations are separate 
sovereigns from the federal government.30  He relied on Congress’s 
plenary power, including “the constitutional power to relax restrictions 
that the political branches have, over time, placed on the exercise of a 
tribe’s inherent legal authority.”31 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas disagreed with the 
majority’s conclusion in Lara that such authority could be found in the 
plenary power doctrine.32  He argued that the Treaty Clause is not a 
power to legislate, and that the Commerce Clause does not provide 
Congress with power over criminal matters.33  Notably, Justice Thomas 
would extend the United States v. Lopez34 and United States v. Morrison35 
Commerce Clause limitations to the Indian Commerce Clause:36  “I 
cannot agree that the Indian Commerce Clause ‘provide[s] Congress 
with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.’”37 
Since 2004, Justice Thomas has raised questions with plenary power 
in four subsequent decisions:  Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,38 Puerto Rico 
                                               
 28. Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII, § 8077(b), (c), 104 Stat. 1892 (1990) (codified at 
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)). 
 29. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (determining that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause did not preclude federal prosecution for a discrete federal offense given that, 
after Duro, Indian tribes retained the inherent sovereign authority of tribal prosecutions). 
 30. See id. (holding that Congress has the constitutional authority to allow tribes to 
prosecute nonmember Indians). 
 31. Id. at 196. 
 32. Id. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 33. Id. at 222–23. 
 34. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 35. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 36. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (rejecting “the argument that Congress may regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect 
on interstate commerce”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68 (invalidating a federal law that 
criminalized possession of a firearm within one thousand feet of a school, as an 
overreach of Commerce Clause authority). 
 37. Lara, 541 U.S. at 224 (alteration in original) (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. 
v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)). 
 38. 570 U.S. 637 (2013).  Thomas’s concurrence questions the source of federal 
authority for the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963, governing 
the removal of Indian children from their families.  Id. at 658–59.  Although not 
addressed here, the Constitution grants Congress the power to define and punish 
“Offences against the Law of Nations.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  Emer de Vattel 
recognized the citizenship of children as a subject of the Law of Nations, stating that 
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v. Sanchez Valle,39 United States v. Bryant,40 and, most recently, Town of 
Vernon v. United States.41  Two of these cases are most relevant.  In Bryant, 
he questioned Congress’s authority for the Major Crimes Act, under 
which the federal government has imposed felony sentences on Indian 
defendants since 1885.42  In his Town of Vernon dissent from the denial 
of certiorari, he questioned the authority of the federal government to 
acquire and hold title to tribal lands, an authority that the United 
States has exercised since the Continental Congress, and that the 
Secretary of the Interior implements regularly under the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934.43 
Justice Kennedy also raised concerns with plenary power.  Justice 
Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Duro, discounting any tribal 
authority over territory and finding that tribal jurisdiction exists only 
because of the “voluntary character of tribal membership and the 
concomitant right of participation in a tribal government.”44  
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy concurred separately in Lara to 
reemphasize his view that voluntary tribal membership provides the 
only basis for tribal criminal jurisdiction.45  He found it troubling that 
Congress could “relax the restrictions on inherent tribal sovereignty in 
a way that extends that sovereignty beyond those historical limits.”46   
Questions on plenary authority are also arising within Congress, 
creating a new obstacle to legislation that would address problems in 
Indian country and strengthen tribal self-government.  For example, in 
                                               
“it is presumed, as matter of course, that each citizen, on entering into society, reserves 
to his children the right of becoming members of it.”  EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS § 212, at 101 (1849); see also John Hayden Dossett, Tribal Nations and Congress’s 
Power to Define Offences against the Law of Nations, 80 MONT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 39. 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016). 
 40. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). 
 41. Nos. 16-1320, 17-8 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denials of 
certiorari). 
 42. See Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1968 (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning the breadth 
of congressional authority to enact the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012)). 
 43. See Vernon, Nos. 16-1320, 17-8, at *2 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denials of certiorari) (arguing that the Supreme Court should have granted 
certiorari to reconsider the constitutionality of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1935, 
25 U.S.C. § 5108 (2012)). 
 44. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990). 
 45. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(declining to find a violation of double jeopardy because Lara did not object to the 
tribe’s authority to try him, and the federal government already had jurisdiction over 
Lara because of inherent sovereign authority). 
 46. Id. 
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2013, Congress addressed problems created by the Oliphant decision,47 
and recognized tribal authority to prosecute domestic violence crimes 
committed by non-Indians.48  This legislation faced opposition from some 
members of Congress who questioned the source of congressional authority 
to recognize and restore tribal criminal jurisdiction.49 
In this context, it is worthwhile to reexamine the constitutional 
sources of federal authority in Indian affairs.  Although plenary power 
remains an important legal doctrine, members of Congress and the 
Court are seeking to limit federal action to enumerated sources and 
narrowly construe the Commerce Clause.50  When tribal leaders ask 
Congress to address problems in Indian country, legislation is 
vulnerable to questions about the source of federal authority.  Even if 
Congress can be convinced, new laws are frequently challenged, and 
federal courts are searching for sources of enumerated constitutional 
authority rather than inferred powers. 
Fortunately, strict construction and original meaning are home turf 
for Indian tribes, who were at the forefront of the Framers’ concerns 
during and after the Revolutionary War.51  Federal power and 
responsibility are deeply embedded in federal title to Indian lands, 
providing ample authority for modernizing Federal Indian law while 
respecting tribal sovereignty and encouraging tribal self-government. 
                                               
 47. Post-Oliphant, tribal authorities lacked jurisdiction over non-Indians, which 
precluded any ability to prosecute “non-Indian” crimes occurring on tribal lands.  In 
particular, tribal authorities could not prosecute non-Indian perpetrators of domestic 
violence against Indian women.  See Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 
63 UCLA L. REV. 1564, 1581–83 (2016) (detailing the domestic violence-related issues in 
prosecuting, especially when a white man would abuse a Native American woman). 
 48. 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. IV 2017) (amending the Indian Civil Rights Act to 
extend tribal jurisdiction to crimes of domestic violence). 
 49. The opposition arose from members of Congress who follow the writings of 
the Heritage Foundation.  See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Joseph Luppino-Esposito, The 
Violence Against Women Act, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, and Indian Tribal Courts, 27 BYU 
J. PUB. L. 1, 5–10 (2012).  Tribal leaders might be forgiven for suspicion of this new 
mode of thought.  For generations, Congress has been content to rely on an atextual 
plenary power when restricting the rights of Indian tribes.  Now, in an era where it is 
possible to contemplate expanding tribal authority, Congress’s power is sharply 
questioned.  However, this is not unique to Indian affairs.  There is generally an 
increased focus on strict adherence to enumerated constitutional authorities.  Currently, 
the Rules of the House of Representatives require that every bill include a Constitutional 
Authority Statement citing the constitutional power granted to Congress.  Rules of the 
House of Representatives, Rule XII(7)(c)(1), H.R. Doc. No. 113-181, at 629 (2015). 
 50. See supra notes 14–21 and accompanying text. 
 51. See supra Section I.B. 
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B.    Solution:  The Original Meaning of the Territory Clause 
The Territory Clause is a primary source of federal authority in 
Indian affairs. There are three bases for this contention. The first is 
structural.  The United States holds land in trust, or restricted fee, for 
Indian tribes and their individual members.52  Because the United 
States holds an interest in title, the Indian tribes and their members 
possess and use these trust lands, but cannot alienate or encumber 
them without federal approval.53  The Supreme Court has described 
Indian title as “the right of occupancy with all its beneficial incidents; . . . 
the right of occupancy being the primary one and as sacred as the fee.”54 
The authority for the United States to hold title in land flows from 
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which provides that 
“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules 
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging 
to the United States.”55  The Territory Clause is a fundamental source 
of federal authority within the territory defined as “Indian country.”56  
This constitutional authority is derived from the federal and tribal 
relationship with land, rather than commerce.57 
The second basis is precedent.  Supreme Court decisions rely on the 
Territory Clause as the source of authority for federal criminal laws in 
“Indian country.”58  Prior to 1948, “Indian country” was an undefined 
term that caused confusion and conflicting decisions.  This debate 
concluded with three decisions, United States v. Celestine,59 United States 
v. Sandoval,60 and United States v. Pelican,61 which all relied on the 
                                               
 52. See, e.g., Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877) (“But the right which 
the Indians held was only that of occupancy.  The fee was in the United States, subject 
to that right, and could be transferred by them whenever they chose.”). 
 53. See Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 597 (1922).  This Article uses the 
abbreviated term “Indian land” when referring to “trust or restricted land.” 
 54. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 115 (1938). 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 56. See Newton, supra note 18, at 210 n.73. 
 57. See infra Section III.A. 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1151 
(2012) (defining “Indian country” as all the land within Indian reservations, all 
dependent Indian communities, and all Indian allotments). 
 59. 215 U.S. 278 (1909). 
 60. 231 U.S. 28 (1913). 
 61. 232 U.S. 442 (1914). 
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Territory Clause.  The statutory definition reflects the holdings of these 
cases, and nearly verbatim adopts their language.62  
While the Supreme Court upheld the statutory definition in 1962 in 
Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary,63  the role of 
the Territory Clause in Indian country has gone unnoticed since that 
time.  Federal territory principles are deeply embedded in federal 
Indian law,64 yet, the role of the Territory Clause is rarely recognized. 
The role of the Territory Clause lacks attention for several reasons.  The 
1948 statutory definition brought consistency of interpretation to the 
term “Indian country,” but obscured the role of the Territory Clause.65  
Congress created the definition during codification of the entirety of Title 
18, so its legislative history is limited to a few notes in a much larger 
congressional report.66  Additionally, until recently, plenary power 
doctrine and broad constructions of the Commerce Clause largely 
eliminated the need for courts to consider other sources of federal 
authority.67  The renewed focus on strictly construing enumerated powers 
requires a fresh look. 
Finally, an area of the law may become settled and its history 
forgotten.  Justice Holmes observed that the law is “eternally weaving 
into her web dim figures of the ever-lengthening past.”68  The goal of 
this Article is to shine new light on the role of the Territory Clause in 
federal Indian law. 
                                               
 62. Compare Celestine 215 U.S. at 285, with § 1151(a) (“All land within the limits of 
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, 
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation”).  Compare Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46, with § 1151(b) (“[A]ll 
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within 
the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without 
the limits of a state”).  Compare Pelican, 232 U.S. at 449, with § 1151(c) (“all Indian 
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-
way running through the same”). 
 63. 368 U.S. 351 (1962) (referring to § 1151 as the prevailing definition of “Indian 
country”). 
 64. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (understanding that state action may 
not infringe on the purposes of an Indian reservation without congressional acquiescence). 
 65. See Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 757, 757 (1948) (codifying Title 18 and defining 
“Indian country”). 
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (citing the legislative history that accompanies 
§ 1151); H.R. Rep. No. 308 (1947). 
 67. See supra notes 18–46 and accompanying text. 
 68. MAX LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES:  HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, 
LETTERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 30 (1943). 
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As a result, U.S. history is the third basis for contending that the 
Territory Clause is a primary source of authority in Indian affairs.  
Today, we think of the Territory Clause for managing the public lands 
or for governance of the territorial islands.  But none of those existed 
in 1787 and the Framers could scarcely have imagined they would.69  
The original purpose of the Territory Clause was to govern the vast 
area claimed by the United States under the Treaty of Paris of 1783, 
most of it held by Indian tribes and known to George Washington and 
his military commanders as the “Indian country.”70  A fundamental 
purpose of the Constitutional Convention, and the drafting of Article 
IV, Section 3 was to create a federal government empowered to 
establish new states to the west, to manage relations with the Indian 
Nations, and to limit violent conflict in the Indian country.71 
The Framers did not believe they owned absolute title to land in Indian 
country. Instead, they claimed it as U.S. territory, meaning the United 
States had the exclusive right to purchase land from the Indian tribes and 
a general power to govern.72  This Article uses the term “Territory Clause” 
rather than “Property Clause,” because the concept of territory guided the 
Framers and better describes the federal interest in tribal lands. 
As settlement stretched westward, the Territory Clause and the 
Treaty Clause were the constitutional authorities used for negotiating 
the boundaries of lands ceded and reserved by Indian Nations.73  
                                               
 69. See generally Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform:  Putting Theory, Policy, 
and Practice in Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2005) (presenting a broad 
history of eras of public land policy post-1787). 
 70. See infra Section I.B (detailing the history of the Territory Clause). 
 71. See infra Section I.C (describing the debate among the Framers during the 
Constitutional Convention that resulted in the drafting of the current Territory Clause). 
 72. See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 35, 52 (1947) 
(explaining that tribes held absolute title to Indian country “subject only to the 
preemption right of purchase acquired by the United States as the successors of Great 
Britain” and describing the federal interest acquired in tribal lands as “simply the 
power to govern and to tax, the same sort of power that [the federal government] 
gained with the acquisition of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands a century later”).  
European claims to tribal lands were based on the Doctrine of Discovery.  See generally 
ROBERT MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED:  THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
LEWIS AND CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY (2008); LINDSAY ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY 
LAW:  HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR 
LANDS (2007); Michael Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine:  Aboriginal Title, Tribal 
Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy in 
Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV 713, 718 (2004); Robert Lee, Accounting for Conquest:  The 
Price of the Louisiana Purchase of Indian Country, 103 J. OF AM. HIST. 921, 922 (2017). 
 73. See infra Section I.D. 
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“From the organization of the National Government, it has been the 
rule of the Nation to purchase the occupancy right from the 
Indians . . . .  The Government has never attempted to survey and 
dispose of lands prior to their cession by the Indians.”74  In other words, 
the United States could purchase the right of occupancy from Tribal 
Nations, but where it did not, those lands remain federal Indian 
territory, with the right of occupancy vested in the tribe.  Since the 
federal government’s founding, it has continually asserted and 
assiduously recorded its interest in tribal lands, maintaining millions 
of records in the Department of the Interior evidencing both the 
federal and tribal interests.75 
The limitation on federal title is also a limitation on federal power, 
unlike federal public lands.  In Kleppe v. New Mexico,76 the Supreme 
Court said that “‘[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to 
Congress is without limitations.’”77   Is this another source of absolute 
power in Indian country, a more grounded version of plenary power?  
No.  In contrast, Indian lands are not public lands.  The United States 
holds tribal lands as a trustee.78 
Because of this, the Territory Clause is a deep well of authority 
attended by principled limitations as evidenced by its historical 
development and adoption in the Constitution.  The Territory Clause 
can only be understood in the historical context of the Northwest 
Ordinance. During the Constitutional Convention, the Framers 
needed to resolve the process for the admission of new states and the 
governance of the western territory. With the Constitutional Convention 
ongoing, the original states agreed to transfer western land claims to 
                                               
 74. THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:  ITS HISTORY, WITH STATISTICS 240 (1884). 
 75. See infra notes 409–414. 
 76. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
 77. Id. at 539 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing United States v. San 
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)). 
 78. See Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386 n.1 (1939) (“The fee of the 
United States is not a dry legal title divorced from substantial powers and 
responsibilities with relation to the land.”); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 
103, 109–10 (1935) (“The Creek Tribe had a fee simple title, not the usual Indian right 
of occupancy with the fee in the United States . . . .  The tribe was a dependent Indian 
community under the guardianship of the United States, and therefore its property 
and affairs were subject to the control and management of that government.  But this 
power to control and manage was not absolute.  While extending to all appropriate 
measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it was subject to limitations inhering 
in such a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions.”).  
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the new federal government under the principles in the Northwest 
Ordinance:79 
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; 
their land and property shall never be taken from them without their 
consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never 
be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by 
Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity, shall from time 
to time be made for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for 
preserving peace and friendship with them.80 
The principles of the Northwest Ordinance81 and cession of western 
lands were a compact among the original states and all that followed.  
This served as the basis for the federal power to govern territory and 
create new states in Article IV, Section 3.  The First Congress 
immediately reenacted the Ordinance in 1789 under the authority of 
the Territory Clause, adapting it to the Constitution.82  These provisions 
signify the intent of the Framers to govern Indian country.  Understood 
in its original context, the Territory Clause offers a sturdy basis for 
Congress to provide “needful rules and regulations” accompanied by a 
duty to respect tribal lands and rights to self-governance.83 
Part I of this Article reviews the origins of the Territory Clause:  a 
story of war, peace, and the struggles of the Continental Congress to 
control the western Indian territory acquired from Great Britain.84  
Notably, this Part highlights George Washington’s principal role in 
developing a policy intended to promote peaceable settlement by 
protecting and purchasing tribal land rights.85  
                                               
 79. See infra Sections I.C. and I.E; see also Ordinance of 1787:  The Northwest 
Territorial Government, reprinted in 1 U.S.C. LVII (2012). 
 80. 1 U.S.C. LIX. 
 81. The Ordinance is reprinted in Volume One of the United States Code among 
the Organic Laws of the United States along with the Declaration of Independence, 
the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution.  See 1 U.S.C. at XLV–LXI.  See 
generally Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 929, 929–68 (1995). 
 82. The Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1789). 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 84. See generally REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, 
1783–1812 4–39 (1967) (discussing the difficulties the first Congress had in developing 
and implementing policies to govern Indian territory); Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage 
Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1009–38 (2014) (analyzing the creation and ultimate 
failure of many early policies attempting to govern Indian territory). 
 85. See HORSMAN, supra note 84, at 5–6 (addressing George Washington’s plan to 
settle members of the Continental Army on the frontier as a method to assure security 
and promote land sale); see also Letter from H. Knox, Secretary at War on Indian 
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Part II provides a detailed legislative history of the definition of 
“Indian country,” demonstrating its roots in the Territory Clause.  Part 
III reviews the status of federal title in Indian land in the current era 
and considers the parallels to other aspects of federal land law.  Part 
IV acknowledges, and respectfully challenges, the position taken by the 
revised editions Handbook of Federal Indian Law.86  Next, Part V considers 
some implications of restoring the Territory Clause to its intended role.  A 
return to understanding the role of the Territory Clause in federal Indian 
law may benefit Indian tribes, Congress, and the Court because it makes 
certain the source of federal authority and limitations on that power. 
This Article closes by drawing some conclusions about the role of 
tribal governments within the structure of the Constitution.  Tribal 
Nations are not “strange sovereigns” to the Constitution, as Professor 
Newton concluded.87  Tribal territories were a central part of the Framers’ 
purpose to promote a peaceful land settlement policy by asserting federal 
control and adopting duties to protect tribal rights.88  Indian tribal 
governments are inherent sovereigns firmly placed within the original 
framework of the Constitution, specifically the Territory Clause. 
I.    PRESIDENT WASHINGTON AND ORIGINS  
OF THE TERRITORY CLAUSE 
[A]nd especially as landed matters are often the subject of our 
councils with you, a matter of the greatest importance and of general 
concern to us, in this case we hold it indispensably necessary that any 
cession of our lands should be made in the most public manner, and 
                                               
Affairs, in 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 124–26 (1788) 
(reporting to Congress on national Indian policy).  Secretary Knox noted that a 
confederation of western Indian tribes opposed settlement of land north of the Ohio 
River.  Id. at 124.  These tribes, he said, “have expressed the highest disgust, at the 
principle of conquest, which has been specified to them, as the basis of their treaties 
with the United States.”  Id.  Noting that the British government had always purchased 
tribal land, Secretary Knox argued that the United States should adopt the same policy.  
Id. at 125.  This recommendation became the cornerstone of federal Indian policy. 
 86. See infra Part IV. 
 87. See Newton, supra note 18, at 197 (distinguishing the sovereignty of other 
foreign nations from the “strange sovereign[ty]” of Indian tribes, which were 
ultimately subject to the federal government). 
 88. Recent historical scholarship emphasizes the outsized role of western Indian lands in 
the drive towards the American Revolution and Constitutional Convention.  See generally ALAN 
TAYLOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS:  A CONTINENTAL HISTORY, 1750–1804 (2016) (discussing 
how land disputes and territorial expansion were catalysts for the American Revolution). 
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by the united voice of the confederacy; holding all partial treaties as 
void and of no effect.89 
 
The purpose of the Territory Clause and Article IV, Section 3 was to 
settle the debate among the confederated states over the “crown 
lands,” those lands reserved for Indian tribes by the Proclamation of 
1763 and ceded to the United States at the end of the Revolutionary 
War.90  Since the start of the Revolutionary War, the colonies and then 
states argued over the disposition of these lands.91  The states without 
western land grants greatly resented the claims of the landed states.92  
After the war ended, the Continental Army disbanded and the 
confederated states faced problems of crippling war debt, 
discontented veterans who had not received their pay, and increasingly 
violent conflicts with Indian tribes on the western border.93  After 
much debate, states began to cede western land claims to the federal 
government.94  Although the Northwest Ordinance and planning for new 
western states became a central concern for the Continental Congress, the 
Articles of Confederation contained no authority for the United States to 
hold or regulate territory, acquire and sell lands, or create new states.   
At the time of the Constitutional Convention, the United States held 
little territory or property other than Indian lands, and was engaged in 
fierce wars with Indian tribes along the western frontier caused by land-
hungry squatters and speculators.95  George Washington and Secretary 
of War Henry Knox worked together with many of their Revolutionary 
War colleagues, all of whom held land bounties in the West as payment 
                                               
 89. Speech of the United Indian Nations, reprinted in ROBERT ALEXANDER, THE 
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE:  CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE THEFT OF NATIVE LAND 
154, 155 (2017). 
 90. See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746–47 (1835) (discussing the 
Proclamation of 1763 in detail and how it controlled land rights). 
 91. See GREGORY H. NOBLES, AMERICAN FRONTIERS:  CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS AND 
CONTINENTAL CONQUEST 87–93 (1997) (describing how the states fought for their own 
territorial interests during and immediately after the Revolutionary War). 
 92. See id. at 92–93 (noting that Maryland, a “land-poor” state, refused to ratify the 
Articles of Confederation until states ceded western territory to Congress). 
 93. See HORSMAN, supra note 84, at 5 (addressing the unanticipated financial 
difficulties and underestimated Indian resistance following the Revolutionary War). 
 94. See NOBLES, supra note 91, at 92–93 (explaining how New York, Connecticut, 
and Virginia eventually ceded their lands, and noting how the internal struggle over 
territory lasted longer than the Revolutionary War). 
 95. Id. at 91–96 (describing the continuous struggles the novice American 
government had in controlling the frontier). 
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for their war service.96  They intended to limit or prevent war in the 
“Indian country,” and developed an orderly process of purchasing tribal 
lands through treaties.97  Their efforts led to the Northwest Ordinance, 
the Territory Clause, and the first Trade and Intercourse Act in 1790.98 
Law reviews do not permit maps.  However, the historical 
development of the Territory Clause requires an understanding of 
three overlapping maps.  The first is a map created by centuries of 
rivalry between European powers in North America.  Long before the 
French and Indian War in 1763, European powers claimed most of the 
continent along the major water routes.99  The British colonies clung 
to the East Coast.100  British colonists were settlers who cleared the land 
and displaced Indian tribes with dense agricultural settlements.101  The 
French held a far greater territory, though more loosely, from Quebec, 
along the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, the Mississippi, to 
Louisiana.102  The French were traders and trappers and lived more 
peacefully alongside Indian people as trading partners, creating 
integrated villages.103  The Spanish Empire included Florida, the 
Southwest, and the coast of California.104  
The second map is more familiar.  The thirteen colonies were not 
equals, as a matter of territory.  Seven “landed” colonies had charters 
that reached west indefinitely.105  Virginia was the largest, by far, but 
New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts laid out competing claims 
                                               
 96. See generally HORSMAN, supra note 84, at 5–6 (explaining in detail the roles 
Washington and Knox played throughout the development of American Indian Policy). 
 97. See id. at 5–7 (discussing the initial plan developed by Washington and Knox 
to address land settlement and frontier insecurities). 
 98. See generally id. (outlining the development and implementation of various 
United States’ policies surrounding territory and expansion). 
 99. See CARL UBBELOHDE, THE AMERICAN COLONIES AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1607–
1763 16–17 (John Hope Franklin & Abraham S. Eisenstadt eds., 1968) (describing the 
settlement patterns of early Europeans on the North American continent). 
 100. Id. at 16. 
 101. Id. at 15–16 (mentioning how developing early British colonies pursued self-
sustaining agriculture, tobacco production, and sugar plantations). 
 102. See id.; see also COLIN G. CALLOWAY, NEW WORLDS FOR ALL:  INDIANS, EUROPEANS, 
AND THE REMAKING OF EARLY AMERICA 4 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 2d ed. 2013) (discussing 
the interactions the various settlements had with native Indian tribes). 
 103. See CALLOWAY, supra note 102, at 5 (describing French and Indian settlements 
whose cultures frequently merged together). 
 104. See NOBLES, supra note 91, at 45–46 (addressing Spanish colonialism within 
North American). 
 105. See Merrill Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 
27, 28 (1964) (noting the debate between “landless” colonies and those with “claims 
extending to the South Seas”). 
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to Virginia.106  The colonial charters of the Carolinas and Georgia laid 
out straight latitudinal lines from the eastern shore to the 
Mississippi.107  Six “small” states had defined western borders:  New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and 
Maryland.108  However, after 1783 and British cession of all lands east to 
the Mississippi, the thirteen states began a debate over the western 
lands.109  All thirteen wanted access, and none had the ability to manage 
military and diplomatic relations with the Indian Nations on their own.110  
The final map is of the journey of a young George Washington.111  
Washington’s first job at age sixteen was as a surveyor of unsettled 
Indian lands in the Shenandoah Valley for the Ohio Company of 
Virginia.112  Ambitious and adept at appraising value, by age twenty, 
Washington had laid out many land claims.113  He bought and sold his 
way into nearly 2500 acres of prime land, much of it in Indian 
country.114  At twenty-one, Washington first traveled to the headwaters 
of the Ohio River and viewed its gateway into the fertile Midwest.115  
Washington was in the service of the Virginia colony’s Lieutenant 
Governor Robert Dinwiddie, who was both an investor in, and 
                                               
 106. See NOBLES, supra note 91, at 92. 
 107. See 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 765, 770–71 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) 
(reprinting the Charter of Georgia establishing the territory boundaries); 5 THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 2743–44 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (reprinting the Charter of 
Carolina expressing the western boundary as extending “as far as the south seas”). 
 108. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:  
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 246 (1990) (describing these as the “landless” colonies). 
 109. See NOBLES, supra note 91, at 91–94 (addressing some of the various disputes 
between states leading up to the Northwest Ordinance). 
 110. See generally HORSMAN, supra note 84, at 5–15 (dissecting the various difficulties 
the new government faced managing new territory and developing a federal Indian 
policy following American independence). 
 111. See generally JOHN FERLING, THE ASCENT OF GEORGE WASHINGTON:  THE HIDDEN 
POLITICAL GENIUS OF AN AMERICAN ICON 12–13 (2009) (discussing the various journeys 
George Washington took throughout his career). 
 112. Id. at 12. 
 113. Id. at 13. 
 114. Id. 
 115. THE JOURNAL OF MAJOR GEORGE WASHINGTON:  AN ACCOUNT OF HIS FIRST 
OFFICIAL MISSION, MADE AS EMISSARY FROM THE GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA TO THE 
COMMANDANT OF THE FRENCH FORCES ON THE OHIO, OCT. 1753–JAN. 1754 v–vii (1959) 
(illustrating a map of Washington’s journey). 
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supervising official for, the Ohio Company of Virginia.116  Dinwiddie’s 
goal was to assert British claims to the Ohio Valley and order the 
French to cease building a string of forts to defend their competing 
claims.117  Washington returned with a defiant answer from the French, 
and a vision for settlement in the Ohio Valley.118  Military leadership 
and speculation in Indian land would combine in ways that defined 
the remainder of Washington’s life in public service. 
These three maps are a starting point for understanding European 
settlement in North America, but they began to transform rapidly with 
the advent of the French and Indian War in 1754, and again with the 
Revolutionary War in 1775.  They provide the backdrop for the United 
States acquisition of its western territory in 1783, and the original 
purpose of the Territory Clause to govern the Indian country. 
A.    The French and Indian War and the Proclamation of 1763  
Washington started the French and Indian War in May of 1754, 
intending to halt the French invasion of Virginia’s western lands as 
established by royal charter.119  Virginia militiamen and tribal allies 
from the Seneca, and others of the Six Nations Iroquois, ambushed a 
French patrol in a conflict over Fort Duquesne, near what is now 
Pittsburgh.120  They were under the command of a twenty-two-year-old 
Washington and the Seneca Half King Tanaghrisson.121  The war 
exploded into an intercontinental conflict, known to Europeans as the 
Seven Years War, between the French and British and their respective 
                                               
 116. Id. at 3. 
 117. Letter from Robert Dinwiddie to the Commandant of the French Forces on 
the Ohio, reprinted in THE JOURNAL OF MAJOR GEORGE WASHINGTON 25–26 (1959). 
 118. Letter from Legardeur de St. Piere to Robert Dinwiddie, reprinted in THE 
JOURNAL OF MAJOR GEORGE WASHINGTON 27–28 (1959) (translating the letter the 
French forces sent in response). 
 119. See THE JOURNAL OF MAJOR GEORGE WASHINGTON:  AN ACCOUNT OF HIS FIRST 
OFFICIAL MISSION, MADE AS EMISSARY FROM THE GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA TO THE 
COMMANDANT OF THE FRENCH FORCES ON THE OHIO, OCT. 1753–JAN. 1754 25–26 (1959).  
The letter from Virginia’s Governor Dinwiddie to the French Commander stated in 
part that “[t]he Lands upon the River Ohio, in the Western Parts of the Colony of 
Virginia, are so notoriously known to be the Property of the Crown of Great-Britain, 
that it is a Matter of equal Concern & Surprize [sic] to me, to hear that a Body of 
French Forces are erecting Fortresses, & making Settlements upon that River, within 
his Majesty’s Dominions.”  Id. 
 120. See Letter from George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, 29 May 1754, 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/02-01-02-
0054 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).  
 121. Id. 
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allies.122  The frontier war in America provided Washington with 
experiences that shaped his future Indian policy and exposed him to 
the realities of the Indian territory while leading and negotiating with 
experienced Native military commanders.123 
The end of the French and Indian War consolidated British control 
as France gave up its territories in North America.124  It also started a 
chain of events that proved disastrous for Tribal Nations.  Previously, 
British colonies had clung to the eastern seaboard, while French 
settlements were concentrated along the St. Lawrence River Valley and 
the Great Lakes.125  After the war, Indian tribes could no longer use the 
French and British competition over the fur trade to preserve their 
lands.126  Colonists poured into the Indian territory, causing Chief 
Pontiac’s confederation of tribes to rise up and kill hundreds of settlers.127 
The British Crown wanted to avoid further war with Indian tribes.128  
Accordingly, King George III issued the Proclamation of 1763 soon 
after the end of the French and Indian War.129  The text of the 
                                               
 122. NOBLES, supra note 91, at 82. 
 123. Washington and the French & Indian War, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON, 
http://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/french-indian-war/washington-and-
the-french-indian-war (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 124. NOBLES, supra note 91, at 116. 
 125. UBBELOHDE, supra note 99, at 16. 
 126. See generally William A. Starna & Jose Antonio Brandao, From the Mohawk-
Mahican War to the Beaver Wars:  Questioning the Pattern, 51 ETHNOHISTORY 725 (2004). 
 127. See NOBLES, supra note 91, at 84–86 (explaining that as soon as the British signed the 
Treaty of Paris, they were confronted with a series of frontier uprisings); see also DOCUMENTS OF 
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 9–15 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000) (demonstrating 
through letters and reports how violence between settlers and Indians escalated). 
 128. Proclamation Line of 1763, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON, 
https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-
encyclopedia/article/proclamation-line-of-1763 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (discussing 
the numerous sociopolitical and economic reasons behind why the British Crown 
wanted to limit westward expansion). 
 129. KING GEORGE III, ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763 (1763); see also Proclamation 
Line of 1763, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON, https://www.mountvernon. 
org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/nproclamation-line-of-1763 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (prohibiting colonists from settling on lands acquired after 
the end of the Seven Years’ War).  Johnson v. M’Intosh cites the Proclamation as the 
source of all federal Indian territory, and it is a cornerstone of the law in both the 
United States and Canada.  21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 594, 596–97 (1823).  The 
Proclamation is referenced in Section 25 of the Constitution Act of 1982, which 
preserved the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Canadian Constitution and 
finalized Canadian independence from Britain.  See Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
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Proclamation is often mischaracterized.130  The Proclamation did not 
simply prohibit colonial settlement beyond the Appalachians.131  
Instead, it was a comprehensive policy and the first expression of three 
legal principles:  (1) the right of preemption over all tribal lands, to be 
purchased with tribal consent and the Crown’s approval; (2) the 
regulation of trade to prevent fraud and unfair practices that caused 
conflict; and (3) the imposition of provisions to address the flight of 
criminals and prevent violence towards Indians.132  These principles 
were later incorporated into the Northwest Ordinance, the 
Constitution, and the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790.133  
B.    The Revolutionary War and State Cessions of Western Indian Territory 
The Proclamation’s effort to manage frontier policy and protect the 
interests of Indian tribes contributed directly to the Revolutionary 
War.134  Colonial governments and settlers resented the restriction on 
their rights to westward expansion.135  Land speculators, like 
Washington and many of the Founders, begrudged the interference 
with their land in the Ohio Valley.136  In 1767, Washington ordered his 
land agent to continue securing land from the newly acquired territory, 
believing that the Proclamation was only a “temporary expedient” used 
to pacify the Indian tribes and would have no lasting impact.137 
                                               
 130. Royal Proclamation of 1763, 3 Geo. 3 (U.K.). 
 131. Id. (outlining Great Britain’s plan to control the settlement of newly acquired 
land following the Seven Years’ War). 
 132. See id. (imposing a number of regulations regarding the settlement of colonists 
on newly acquired territory and their interactions with Indian tribes). 
 133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. IV, § 3 (granting Congress the power to govern 
territories and regulate trade with Indian tribes); An Ordinance for the Government 
of the Territory of the United States North West of the River of Ohio, reprinted in 32 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 340–41 (1905) (asserting in 
Article 3 of the Northwest Ordinance that the property rights and liberty of Indians 
shall not be “invaded or disturbed”); DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 
supra note 127, at 14–15 (reprinting the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 
which strictly regulated trade and land sale between settlers and Indians). 
 134. See generally COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE SCRATCH OF A PEN:  1763 AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF NORTH AMERICA (2006) (discussing how policies and events served 
as catalysts for American independence). 
 135. See id. at 98 (noting how the Proclamation failed to prevent colonial settlement 
onto Indian lands). 
 136. Id. at 98–99. 
 137. Letter from George Washington to William Crawford, 17 September 1767, 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/02-08-02-
0020 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
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The Quebec Act of 1774,138 one of the “Intolerable Acts,”139 dashed 
Washington’s hopes for riches from western lands, as it purported to 
transfer the northwest Indian territory to the Province of Quebec 
despite the land grants in the colonial charters.140  However, those 
dashed hopes turned into new resolve. The Declaration of 
Independence lists both the Proclamation and the Quebec Act as 
grievances that required American independence.141  
During the Revolutionary War, General Washington soon found 
himself in a position similar to King George with respect to Indian 
affairs.  Freed from the restrictions of the Proclamation, settlers and land 
speculators moved into the western regions and conflicts with Indians 
increased.142  States like Virginia attempted to limit westward expansion 
through laws requiring state consent.143  Thomas Jefferson noted the 
futility in 1776:  “They will settle the lands in spite of everybody.”144 
The landed states’ claims to the “western lands” soon became a 
matter of intense controversy among the thirteen colonies.145  The 
seven landed states laid out conflicting claims and wanted the western 
lands for their own citizens and for the value of land sales.146  The other 
six states felt strongly that the western lands should be shared among 
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the entire country.147  They were concerned about losing influence to 
larger states, wanted their own citizens to have access, and needed the 
funds from western land sales to pay debts from the war.148 
Maryland led the effort among the small states, and refused to ratify 
the Articles of Confederation.149  Maryland made three arguments in 
support of the motion to cede western land claims and form new states 
to the west.  First, the landed states’ conflicting claims would tear the 
new United States apart.150  This concern was founded in the violent 
conflicts between Pennsylvania and Connecticut over the Wyoming 
Valley region, present day Scranton.151  Maryland reasoned that if all 
the states benefitted from the settlement of western lands, the lands 
would create bonds of common interest in fighting the war.152  Second, 
Maryland contended that funds from sales of western lands should pay 
the enormous war debt collectively.153  Third, Maryland was unwilling 
to join the United States if the landed states could create vassal states, 
and insisted that new states be admitted as equal sovereigns.154 
Then financial and military pressures mounted.  The Continental 
Army needed funding, and land speculation companies offered funds 
for clear title to western lands.155  Conflicts with Indian tribes 
increased.156  In the spring of 1780, the British army began raiding in 
Virginia, an immediate threat.157  The French minister to the United 
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States made clear that France would supply ships and soldiers if the 
States would ratify the Articles of Confederation.158  In response to 
these pressures, and at the insistence of Maryland, the Continental 
Congress agreed in principle that the landed states would cede their 
claims and form new states to the west.159 
New York was the first to cede land to the central government with 
an explicit disclaimer to all tribal lands of the “Six Nations, and their 
tributaries.”160  The very first “territory” ceded to the United States was 
Indian territory, which demonstrated the need for national 
authority—an authority that did not exist in the Articles of 
Confederation.  The New York cession became effective on March 1, 
1781 and Maryland ratified the Articles of Confederation on the same 
day.161  In response, the French sent thousands of troops and the 
British surrendered at the Battle of Yorktown six months later.162 
The Revolutionary War ended with the Treaty of Paris on September 
3, 1783, setting the western boundary of the United States at the 
Mississippi River.163  The Continental Congress issued three sets of 
instructions to the negotiators—John Adams, Ben Franklin, and John 
Jay—leaving no doubt that the primary goal of their negotiations was 
to gain possession of western tribal territory.164  The first instruction, 
in August of 1779, demanded “clear and indisputable [b]oundaries” 
by a line drawn “[s]traight to the [s]ource of the River Mississippi.”165  
In October of 1780, the second set of instructions addressed Britain’s 
contention that it had no power to grant title to tribal lands, countering 
that the Proclamation of 1763 expressly declared that the western lands 
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“were within the sovereignty and dominion of that crown, 
notwithstanding the reservation of them to the use of the Indians.”166 
The third set of instructions, dated August 20, 1782, was a forty-page 
legal argument about the territorial rights of the thirteen states, 
reciting the boundaries set by colonial land grants, charters, royal 
commissions, and treaty cessions.167  It cited the treaty ending the 
French and Indian War as the authority for the colonies to expand 
outward to the Mississippi River.”168  The instructions again seized on 
the Proclamation of 1763 as evidence of their claim:  “In a word, this 
part of the proclamation seems to have been intended merely to shut 
up the land offices, not to curtail limits; to keep the Indians in peace, 
not to relinquish the rights accruing under the charters, and 
particularly that of pre-emption.”169  The instructions expressed 
confidence that the western territories were the property of the United 
States and could be used to pay war debts.170 
The Revolutionary War had much to do with the American desire to 
control the West, a desire that only increased during the conflict.171  
Historian William Hogeland stated, “American independence without 
the American West wouldn’t be American independence at all.  
Ceding the great region that Britain had long been struggling to 
reserve for Indians wasn’t generous but a sine qua non of peace.”172 
In the euphoria of victory, even more settlers and land speculators 
flooded west, while the states debated the terms of further western land 
cessions.173  On September 23, 1783, Washington wrote to his Chief of 
Artillery, Knox, and drew his attention to the need for states cessions 
of western Indian lands: 
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I have laboured since, & I hope not unsuccessfully, to convince the 
Members of Congress that while the United States and the State of 
Virginia are disputing about the right, or the terms of the Cession, 
Land jobbers and a lawless Banditti who would bid defiance to the 
Authority of either & more than probably involve this Country in an 
Indian War . . . .174 
When Washington left military service in 1783, his first action as a 
private citizen was to visit his extensive land holdings in western New 
York, Pennsylvania, and what became Ohio and Kentucky.175  
Washington spent thirty-four days traveling by horseback and 
discovered three things.176  First, squatters occupied his land and defied his 
ownership.177  Second, western settlers were drifting towards allegiances 
with the British and Spanish who controlled trade along the Great Lakes 
and the Mississippi River.178  Third, American relocation to the West was 
creating extreme hostilities with Indian tribes.179  Ultimately, Washington 
cut his trip short because of threats of violence from Indian tribes whose 
lands were under assault from unchecked western migration.180 
After returning from his western travels, Washington put a great deal 
of political effort into convincing the states to cede control over Indian 
territory to the federal government.181  Knox soon became Secretary of 
War to the Continental Congress, which at that time was the highest-
ranking political position in the United States.182  Eventually Virginia ceded 
its western territory in 1784183 and was quickly followed by Massachusetts184 
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and Connecticut,185 all ceding their claims to “territory.”  This set the stage 
for the Northwest Ordinance, and eventually a new Constitution. 
C.    Development of the Northwest Ordinance 
At first view, it may seem a little extraneous, when I am called upon 
to give an opinion upon the terms of a Peace proper to be made with 
the Indians, that I should go into the formation of New States; but 
the Settlement of the Western Country and making a Peace with the 
Indians are so analogous that there can be no definition of the one 
without involving considerations of the other.  [F]or I repeat it, 
again, and I am clear in my opinion, that policy and economy point 
very strongly to the expediency of being upon good terms with the 
Indians, and the propriety of purchasing their Lands in preference 
to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their Country.  
—George Washington186 
 
While Washington did not write the Northwest Ordinance, he and 
his military colleagues propelled it into existence.187  The push for a 
new state in the Ohio Valley began near the end of the Revolutionary 
War, beginning as a petition from the officers of the Continental 
Army.188  Unpaid and embarrassed by their poverty, 285 officers signed 
a letter urging Congress to buy land in the Ohio Valley from the Indian 
tribes, deliver their promised land bounties, and form a distinct 
government “to be admitted as one of the confederated States of 
America.”189  Seven of the signatories were Generals—including Knox 
and Rufus Putnam.190  Washington forwarded this plan to Congress:  
“[T]he appearance of so formidable a Settlement in the vicinity of 
their Towns (to say nothing of the barrier it would form against our 
other Neighbours) would be the most likely means to enable us to 
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purchase upon equitable terms of the Aborigines their right of 
[preoccupancy and to] induce them to relinquish our Territories, and 
to remove into the illimitable regions of the West.”191 
Putnam pressed Washington to ensure Congress approved the 
officers’ petition.192  Washington responded that he “exerted every 
power [he] was master of” yet was not optimistic for a speedy 
response.193  Instead, Jefferson led the early congressional efforts to 
plan for the western territories.194  Fresh from a victory, the United 
States was not inclined to respect tribal rights to land and military 
strength.195  The United States attempted to dictate treaties on 
exclusively American terms, intimidating some tribal leaders into 
signing without authority from their larger tribal government 
bodies.196  However, Congress disbanded the Continental Army, and 
the tribes did not intend to withdraw from their lands.197  They soon 
renounced the treaties and the Northwest Indian War followed.198  
Although Congress adopted an early version of the Northwest 
Ordinance in 1784, it was never effective because it failed to account 
for Indian rights.199  Indian Nations grew increasingly hostile to 
encroachment on their lands, while British posts along the Great Lakes 
supplied trade goods and weapons.200 
Congress appointed Knox Secretary of War in 1785, with 500 soldiers 
guarding the entire western frontier.201  Large groups of southern 
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Indians led by Dragging Canoe and Alexander McGillivray organized.202  
The frontier exploded with violence against settlers and state militias 
attempting to protect them.203  Knox soon raised an alarm with Congress 
through a series of reports, in which he proposed to reset national 
Indian policy, pay for voluntary Indian land cessions, regulate trade, 
and maintain a sufficient military force to keep the peace and restrain 
settlers who committed crimes against Indians.204  However, the 
Continental Congress lacked the authority to respond.205  In August of 
1786, even before Shays’ Rebellion, Washington wrote to Jay 
expressing concern that the Union would be unable to survive without 
a stronger centralized government.206  American efforts at imperialism 
sparked a military backlash from Indian Nations.207 
By the end of 1786, the Indian tribes formed a confederacy with 
regular council meetings and a commitment to stop American 
settlements north of the Ohio River.208  This new union of Indian 
Nations met at Fort Detroit under British protection, adding 
considerably to its collective power.209  The Five Nations of the 
Iroquois, as well as Huron, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, 
Pottawatomi, Miami, Cherokees and the Wabash Confederated, sent a 
unified demand to Congress.  They demanded that the Ohio River be 
the permanent boundary with the United States, that land surveyors be 
prohibited from crossing the Ohio River, that “partial Treaties” were 
void, and that all treaties and land negotiations must be with the 
confederacy as a whole.210 
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In December 1786, Washington and Knox began to correspond 
about the need for a strong national government.211  Washington wrote 
that Great Britain “is at this moment sowing the Seeds of jealousy & 
discontent among the various tribes of Indians on our frontier . . . she 
will improve every opportunity to foment the spirit of turbulence 
within the bowels of the United States.”212  Knox responded in January 
of 1787, urging Washington to attend the Constitutional Convention, 
and laying out his famous sketch for a strong federal government “of 
the least possible powers.”213  Indian lands were central to the concerns 
of the Framers from the beginning. 
Putnam renewed his efforts to claim military land bounties and settle 
the Ohio Valley.214  He and two other generals formed the Ohio 
Company, and in July 1787 sent Manasseh Cutler to New York to negotiate 
for the purchase of land, offering millions to the insolvent Continental 
Congress.215  These were veteran officers who had experienced the 
French and Indian War and intended to settle in the Ohio Valley.216  One 
of their principle terms of negotiation was a demand for an Indian peace 
policy in a revised Northwest Ordinance.217 
On July 10, 1787, Knox returned from a visit with Washington in 
Philadelphia, and submitted another alarming report to Congress 
about continued Indian hostilities:218   
And the whole western territory is liable to be wrested out of the 
hands of the Union by lawless adventurers, or by the savages . . . [i]n 
the present embarrassed state of public affairs and entire deficiency 
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of funds an [I]ndian war of any considerable extent and duration 
would most exceedingly distress the United States.219   
His report threatened great loss of revenue from western land sales 
and development.220  The next day, the first reading of the Northwest 
Ordinance appears in the Journals of the Continental Congress, with 
its pledge of utmost good faith towards the Indians and their lands.221 
Washington was deeply involved in the development of the 
Northwest Ordinance.222  In early July 1787, a significant political shift 
brought finality to the Ordinance of 1787.223  Members of Congress 
who were also participating in the Convention began to travel from 
Philadelphia to New York.224  With Federalists now in the majority, 
Richard Henry Lee, Edward Carrington, John Kean, Melancton Smith, 
and Nathan Dane were appointed to a new drafting committee, which 
quickly produced the Northwest Ordinance.225  Edward Carrington 
served as chair,226  and had served under both Washington and Knox 
in the artillery at Yorktown.227   
With his military colleagues in control of advising Congress on 
Indian policy, purchasing the first large settlement in the Ohio Valley, 
and the drafting committee, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 closely 
resembles Washington’s 1783 plan:  purchase of tribal lands through 
treaty, settlements under federal control, and an orderly process for 
admission of new states.228 
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D.    History and Structure Demonstrate the Indian Country Purpose of the 
Territory Clause 
The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful 
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property 
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution 
shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, 
or of any particular state.229 
Washington pressed forward with his plan for Indian affairs and western 
lands during the Constitutional Convention.  He attended as a delegate from 
Virginia,230 and was elected unanimously as president of the Convention.231 
The Indian wars and western territories were not the only purpose of 
the Constitutional Convention, but fit into the fundamental structure of 
financial, military, and territorial reasons for a strong federal 
government.232  Underlying Shays’ Rebellion was the discontent of 
veterans who were receiving neither the pay for their service nor the 
land bounties promised in the west.233  The rebellion called into 
question the financial condition of the United States and the ability to 
secure the western lands.234  Washington had vast experience in the 
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Continental Congress); William P. Kladky, Constitutional Convention, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S 
MOUNT VERNON, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/ 
article/constitutional-convention. 
 232. See The Constitution:  An Enduring Document, in Outline of the U.S. Government 4, 
U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, https://photos.state.gov/libraries/amgov/30145/publications-english/ 
1310_Outline_of_US_Government_English_TEXT_Low_WEB.pdf (providing that the 
Constitutional Convention’s delegates aimed to construct a more centralized government to 
remedy the Articles of Confederation’s inability to collect taxes, force states to contribute troops 
or equipment, or enforce decisions of state disputes over boundaries). 
 233. Rahul Tilva, Shays’ Rebellion, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON, 
http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/shays-rebellion.  Shays’ 
Rebellion was a result of the monetary debt crisis after the American Revolutionary 
War.  Id.  Daniel Shays led a violent uprising against debt collections in Massachusetts 
that highlighted the inherent weaknesses of the national government under the 
Articles of Confederation.  Id. 
 234. See id. (describing how the rebellion cast doubt on the state of the new 
country’s finances and raised issues about the weak governmental structure under the 
Articles of Confederation). 
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western lands,235 his contemporaries recognized the weight of his 
influence,236 and his support among military veterans was nearly 
complete.237  The Territory Clause was the capstone to Washington’s 
plan for western Indian lands and the admission of new states. 
There are four reasons to postulate that the Territory Clause was 
originally intended to include Indian lands.  First, Indian lands were 
expressly included within the territorial boundaries established by the 
Treaty of Paris.238  The Continental Congress insisted on including the 
tribal lands protected by the Proclamation of 1763, so there can be no 
doubt that the Framers considered these boundaries to be 
“territory . . . belonging to the United States.”239  Jefferson, as the first 
Secretary of State, declared:  “What did I understand to be our right in 
the Indian soil?  1.  A right of preemption of their lands, that is to say, the 
sole [and] exclusive right of purchasing from them whenever they should 
be willing to sell.  2.  A right of regulating the commerce between them 
and the whites.”240  Here, Jefferson readily distinguishes the federal 
interest in Indian land title from the authority to regulate commerce. 
Second, New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, and Connecticut had 
recently ceded their claims to 175 million acres of western Indian lands 
after a great debate that turned the tide of the Revolutionary War and 
consumed the deliberations of the Continental Congress.241  The state 
                                               
 235. See generally CHARLES H. AMBLER, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE WEST 147, 149–
50 (1936) (suggesting Washington’s expertise in surveying western lands and noting 
his expansive land ownership). 
 236. See John C. Ranney, The Bases of American Federalism, 3 WM & MARY Q. 1, 28, 32 
(Jan. 1946). 
 237. Id. at 17, 28 (describing Washington’s influence in the Constitution’s 
acceptance and his importance to military veteran support). 
 238. See Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. II, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80 (outlining the 
geographical boundaries of the United States after the Revolutionary War). 
 239.  In 1793, the Chief of Engineers of the War Department produced a map 
showing the territories of the United States, Britain, and Spain on the North American 
continent.  This map demonstrates plainly that the United States asserted its territory 
to include all lands west to the Mississippi, as described in the Treaty of Paris.  The 
region west of the Appalachians is described as the “Western Territory.”  The lands of 
various Tribal Nations are depicted on the map within that territory.  See United States 
of North America with the British Territories and Those of Spain According to the 
Treaty of 1784, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/78116872 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 240. Notes of a Conversation with Mr. Hammond (June 3, 1792), in 1 THE WORKS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 219, 225 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1904). 
 241. Acquisition of the Public Domain, 1781–1867, Bureau of Land Management, 
Public Land Statistics, Table 1-1, Acquisition of the Public Domain BLM/OC/ST-
16/003+1165, P-108-5.  May 2016.  The western land cessions at this stage included all 
of present-day Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and half of Minnesota.  
238 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:205 
 
cessions demonstrated the Framers’ understanding that the United 
States held title to a vast territory of tribal lands.  The state cessions all 
used the term “territory,” to describe the claims to western Indian 
lands transferred to the United States.242  The Northwest Ordinance 
also uses the term “territory” repeatedly to describe the vast land area 
northwest of the Ohio River.243  It is reasonable to assume that the 
Framers used the term in the same sense as the contemporaneous 
expressions of four state legislatures and Congress. 
Third, the Northwest Ordinance specifically called for federal rules and 
regulations on tribal lands.244  It provided that “laws founded in justice 
and humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs 
being done to [Indian tribes], and for preserving peace and friendship 
with them.”245  A fundamental purpose of the Territory Clause was to 
address the problems of crime and violence on the tribal lands. 
Finally, the Indian territory was the only federal territory in existence 
at the time.  In the current era, we think of the Territory Clause for the 
management of National Forests or the territorial islands such as 
Puerto Rico or Guam.246  However, none of these existed in 1787, and 
the drafters of the Constitution could not have imagined they would. 
The purpose of the Territory Clause for tribal lands is evident not 
only in its structure and history, but also in the writing of the Framers. 
In the Federalist Papers No. 7, Alexander Hamilton stated that the 
purpose of the Territory Clause was to manage these recently ceded 
western lands and avoid conflict between the states.247  Furthermore, 
in the Federalist Papers No. 38, James Madison expressed a strong view 
                                               
After the North Carolina and Georgia cessions, the total was 237 million acres ceded 
to the federal government.  Id. 
 242. See supra notes 161, 183–185 and accompanying text. 
 243. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 314–20 (1936). 
 244. Id. at 318. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1911) (holding that Congress 
has the authority to establish national forest reservations under the Territory Clause); 
United States v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir. 1987) (“We begin with the 
proposition that Congress can, pursuant to the plenary powers conferred by the 
Territory Clause, legislate as to Puerto Rico in a manner different from the rest of the 
United States” (citations omitted)). 
 247. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 7, [17 November 1787], FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://Founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0159 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
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that the Articles contained no authority to govern the ceded western 
lands, and that the new constitution should contain such authority.248 
This purpose of the Territory Clause was not the subject of 
controversy during the Constitutional Convention because the need 
for federal authority was apparent.  In the Federalist Papers No. 43, 
Madison wasted little ink:  “This is a power of very great importance . . . 
rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies and questions concerning 
the Western territory sufficiently known to the public.”249 
Just prior to the Constitutional Convention, Georgia and South 
Carolina entered the Treaty of Beaufort to settle a border dispute.  
This resolved South Carolina’s claim to a narrow strip of western land, 
ceding to the United States all “right of preemption of the soil from 
the native Indians.”250  Only the southern claims of North Carolina and 
Georgia remained.251  Madison’s Journal of the Constitutional 
Convention demonstrates how these were handled, and confirms the 
purpose of the Territory Clause to provide federal control of the 
Indian lands reserved by the Proclamation.252 
E.    Journal of the Constitutional Convention Regarding the Territory Clause 
On August 30, 1787, Daniel Carroll of Maryland, the last holdout to 
sign the Articles of Confederation, began the discussion of the “crown 
lands” that led to the text of the Territory Clause.253  Carroll suggested, 
“that it might be proper to provide, that nothing in the Constitution 
should affect the right of the United States to lands ceded by Great 
Britain in the treaty of peace.”254 
After some discussion of the process for new states, Carroll again 
offered his proviso of federal jurisdiction for all lands “ceded to [the 
United States] by the treaty of peace.”255  Madison suggested that the 
                                               
 248. James Madison, The Federalist No. 38, [12 January] 1788, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-0228 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 249. James Madison, The Federalist No. 43, [23 January] 1788, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-0248 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 250. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS UNDER THE CONFEDERATION, 
TREATIES, PROCLAMATIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS HAVING OPERATION AND RESPECT TO THE 
PUBLIC LANDS 35 (1817). 
 251. Id. 
 252. James Madison, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 654, 704 (E.H. Scott ed., 
1893) [hereinafter Madison, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION] (suggesting the 
United States has power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes). 
 253. Mary Virginia Geiger, DANIEL CARROLL, A FRAMER OF THE CONSTITUTION (1943). 
 254. Madison, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 252, at 634. 
 255. See id. at 634–37. 
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proviso should not affect the claims of particular States.  Abraham 
Baldwin from Georgia raised the doctrine of uti possidetis, a principle 
of international law that newly formed states should have the same 
territorial rights as before their independence.256  By this, Baldwin 
intended to reserve Georgia’s claim to western lands.257   
Madison suggested a savings clause to address Baldwin’s concern.258  
There was a postponement on the issue, following which Gouverneur 
Morris proposed the current text of the Territory Clause.259  
Gouverneur Morris was a brilliant lawyer, leading drafter of the 
Constitution, and one of Washington’s strongest congressional 
supporters.260  He wrote, “The Legislature shall have power to dispose 
of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting, the territory 
or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this 
Constitution contained, shall be so construed as to prejudice any 
claims, either of the United States or of any particular State.”261 
Madison’s involvement is also noteworthy.  He was a leading 
advocate for addressing the perplexing problems of Indian Affairs 
under the Articles of Confederation.262  The Articles had created 
ambiguously shared power of “regulating the trade and managing all 
affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided 
that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not 
infringed or violated.”263  With the borders of seven states essentially 
undefined, this provision was meaningless.  In 1784, he wrote to James 
Monroe, “If this proviso be taken in its full latitude, it must destroy the 
authority of Congress altogether, since no act of Cong[ress] within the 
                                               
 256. See id. at 638; Uti Possidetis Juris, LEGAL INFORMATION INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/uti_possidetis_juris (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 257. See Madison, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 252, at 638. 
 258. Id. at 637–38. 
 259. See id. at 638. 
 260. See Delegates to the Constitutional Convention:  Gouverneur Morris, TEACHING AM. 
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 262. See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 
1152–53, 1155 (1995) (highlighting Madison’s role in ensuring that the federal 
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limits of a State can be conceived which will not in some way or other 
encroach upon the authority [of the] States.”264 
At the beginning of the Constitutional Convention, Madison had 
proposed a series of powers for Congress, the first three all related to issues 
of western territory and Indian tribes:  (1) disposing of unappropriated 
lands of the United States; (2) instituting temporary governments for new 
states formed in those lands; and (3) regulating affairs with the Indians, 
both within and outside the limits of the United States.265  Madison’s 
proposal for power to regulate all affairs with the Indians did not succeed 
entirely and was limited to regulating commerce with the Indian tribes.266  
However, he and the other federalists expanded the federal power “to 
dispose of” unappropriated lands to include the power of “all needful 
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging 
to the United States.”267  This provided the federal government with the 
authority to regulate wherever it held territory, including Indian lands 
where the federal government claimed the right of preemption.268  By 
suggesting the savings clause for “any claims of the United States, or of 
any particular state,” Madison quelled further debate and entrenched 
federal authority over Indian territory in the text.269 
All state claims to Indian lands were resolved through subsequent 
land cessions.  North Carolina ceded its lands at the time of 
ratification.270  Georgia maintained a claim on lands until 1802 when 
its cession required that “the United States shall, at their own expense, 
extinguish . . . the Indian title to all the other lands within the State of 
Georgia.”271  This last land cession from an original colony settled any 
questions of claims for state authority on Indian lands. 
                                               
 264. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, 27 November 1784, FOUNDERS 
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Thus, the purpose of the Territory Clause, as drafted, was to grant 
authority to the federal government to govern the huge expanse of 
Indian territory that stretched both inside and outside the boundaries 
of states.272  President Washington and the First Congress seized that 
power immediately after ratification. 
F.    The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 and Washington’s 
Promise to Indian Nations 
Washington was sworn in as the first President of the United States 
on April 30, 1789.  He was anxious to come to peaceful terms with the 
Indian tribes.  While North Carolina continued to debate ratification 
and its western land cession, Knox continued as Secretary of War.273  In 
1789, Knox sent an extensive memorandum to Washington compiled 
by a group of federal Indian commissioners who had traveled to meet 
with the southern tribes.274  The memorandum reported discussions 
with Piominko, who was the Principal War Chief of the Chickasaw 
                                               
 272. The relation of the Territory Clause to Indian lands was noted by early 
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Nation, and highlighted the need for federal authority over Indian 
land cessions from the states.275 
Knox’s memorandum also includes a recommendation for licensing 
Indian traders, to prevent fraudulent traders from creating strife with 
the Indian tribes.276  Knox wrote to Washington again on July 7, 1789: 
It would reflect honor on the new government and be attended with 
happy effects were a declarative Law to be passed that the Indian 
tribes possess the right of the soil of all lands within their limits 
respectively and that they are not to be divested thereof but in 
consequence of fair and bona fide purchases, made under the 
authority, or with the express approbation of the United States.277 
On January 4, 1790, in a comprehensive statement of Indian affairs 
along the southern frontier, Knox estimated the cost of war and peace 
with the Indian Nations along the southwestern frontier, and 
concluded that peace and diplomacy were more honorable and more 
cost-effective than war: 
The various opinions which exist on the proper mode of treating the 
Indians, require that some system should be established on the subject. 
That the [I]ndians possess the natural rights of man, and that they 
ought not wantonly to be divested thereof cannot be well denied. 
Were these rights ascertained, and declared by law—were it enacted 
that the [I]ndians possess the right to all their territory which they 
have not fairly conveyed, and that they should not be divested 
thereof, but in consequence of open treaties, made under the 
authority of the United States, the foundation of peace and justice 
would be laid.278 
As a result, Congress enacted the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act 
on July 22, 1790.279  It contains virtually identical legal principles to 
those incorporated into the Proclamation of 1763 and repeated in the 
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Northwest Ordinance:  (1) regulation of trade in Section 3; (2) a 
federal right of preemption to tribal lands in Section 4; and (3) 
criminal laws to prevent violence between Indians and non-Indians in 
Section 5.280  
Two things are noteworthy in the statutory language.  First, it affirms 
a federal right of preemption in tribal lands, a property or territorial 
interest tied to the Framers’ understanding that the federal 
government is trustee and tribal lands cannot be sold without tribal 
consent.281  Second, the criminal provisions demonstrate that Congress 
did not limit its authority to only Indian commerce or treaties.  The 
First Congress asserted criminal jurisdiction in Indian territory.282   
Soon after enactment of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 
President Washington wrote to the Seneca Nation of New York in 1790: 
I am not uninformed that the six nations have been led into some 
difficulties with respect to the sale of their lands since the peace.  But 
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SEC. 3.  And be it further enacted, That every person who shall attempt to trade 
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punishable by the laws of such state or district, such offender or offenders shall 
be subject to the same punishment, and shall be proceeded against in the same 
manner as if the offence had been committed within the jurisdiction of the 
state or district to which he or they may belong, against a citizen or white in 
habitant thereof. 
Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 137. 
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I must inform you that these arose before the present government 
of the United States was established, when the separate States, and 
individuals under their authority, undertook to treat with the Indian 
tribes respecting the sale of their lands. 
But the case is now entirely altered—the general government only 
has the power to treat with the Indian nations, and any treaty formed 
and held without its authority will not be binding. 
Here then is the security for the remainder of your lands—No state 
nor person can purchase your lands, unless at some public treaty 
held under the Authority of the United States.  The general 
Government will never consent to your being defrauded—But it will 
protect you in all your just rights . . . . 
But your great object seems to be the security of your remaining 
lands, and I have therefore upon this point, me[a]nt to be 
sufficiently strong and clear. 
That in future you cannot be defrauded of your lands—That you 
possess the right to sell, and the right of refusing to sell your lands.283 
Washington’s covenant with the Indian Nations to protect Indian lands 
and hold them in trust is woven into the fiber of the Territory Clause, 
the Northwest Ordinance, and is in effect today.284  Washington’s 
commitment will remain in effect so long as the United States remembers 
the promises made to Indian Nations during the framing of the Constitution. 
II.    THE ORIGIN OF THE DEFINITION OF INDIAN COUNTRY 
Washington and his military commanders used the term “Indian 
country” during the Revolutionary War, referring to land that was 
occupied and held by Indian tribes.285  This term entered federal law 
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early on, and is still in use today.  Indian country is defined at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1151 (2012), and determines the geographic scope of federal, tribal, 
and state government jurisdiction for many purposes: 
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, 
the term “Indian country,” as used in this chapter, means (a) all land 
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of 
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the 
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the 
borders of the United States whether within the original or 
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or 
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian 
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way 
running through the same.286 
This Part provides a detailed legislative history of the definition of 
“Indian country,” demonstrating its roots in the Territory Clause.  The 
definition was created during codification of Title 18 of the United 
States Code in 1948.287  Because of this, its legislative history is very 
limited.  The short note from the House Committee on the Revision 
of the Laws cites a few cases and provides that:  “This section 
consolidates numerous conflicting and inconsistent provisions of law 
into a concise statement of the applicable law.”288  In light of this scarce 
record, this Part traces the history of the definition of Indian country 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 
A.    Indian Country in the Early Federal Laws 
Knox developed the first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act in 1790 
and included the undefined term “Indian country,” using it 
interchangeably with “any town, settlement or territory belonging to 
any nation or tribe of Indians.”289 
The first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act included provisions 
punishing crimes committed within the Indian territory.290  The House 
of Representatives debated the criminal provisions during 
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reauthorization in December of 1792.  Some urged removal of the 
criminal provisions because they were fully provided for by treaties or 
by the laws of the States.291  The motion was defeated with an argument 
based in the Territory Clause.  Specifically, the government has the 
power to legislate in the territories because without this power there 
cannot be peace with the Indian tribes, and it was impossible for every 
case to be addressed by the terms of treaties.292 
Congress reauthorized the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act 
successively every three years until 1802 when Congress made the Act 
permanent.293  The amendments grew more specific to address 
problems on the frontier, and succeeding versions described “Indian 
country” by the boundaries established in treaties.  For example, the 
1796 Act fixed a western boundary and required passports for non-
Indians to travel across the border, providing that the line could be adjusted 
for ongoing treaty cessions.294  In 1799 and 1802, the boundary was 
conformed to new treaties.295  In both of these new laws, the terms “Indian 
country” and “Indian territory” are undefined and used synonymously.296 
In 1817, Congress enacted the first version of the Indian Country 
Crimes Act.297  It provided for federal punishment of crimes whether 
committed by an Indian or non-Indian.  However, it provided an 
exception for “any offence committed by one Indian against another.” 
This exception is still found in current law.298  While the 1817 Act did not 
use the term “Indian country,” it applied to “any town, district, or territory, 
belonging to any nation or nations, tribe or tribes, of Indians.”299 
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834300 was a significant 
adjustment of federal Indian policy in the wake of the Indian Removal 
Act301 and President Jackson’s policy of dispossessing the southeastern 
                                               
 291. 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 750–51 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1792). 
 292. Id. at 751. 
 293. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139 (1802); Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 
Stat. 743 (1799); Act of May 19, 1976, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469 (1796); Act of Mar. 1, 1793, 
ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329 (1793). 
 294. See § 3, 1 Stat. at 470. 
 295. See § 1, 2 Stat. at 139–41; § 1, 1 Stat. at 743–44. 
 296. See 2 Stat. 139; 1 Stat. 743. 
 297. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1152 (2012)). 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834). 
 301. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, § 5, 4 Stat. 411, 412 (1830). 
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tribes of their lands and relocating them to Oklahoma.302  The 1834 
Act’s updated definition of “Indian country” was intended to hasten 
the removal of the southeastern tribes to the West: 
That all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not 
within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of 
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the 
Mississippi River, and not within any state to which the Indian title 
has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this act, be taken and 
deemed to be the Indian country.303 
This new definition caused significant confusion, particularly over 
tribal lands located within the boundary of a state but expressly 
exempted from the state’s jurisdiction by treaty or statute.304  The term 
“Indian country” became even more perplexing after 1874 when 
Congress omitted the definition.  The Revised Statutes of 1874 was the 
first codification of federal laws and repealed all prior federal statutes 
passed.305  The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834 was codified 
in its entirety, omitting only the definition of “Indian country.”306  The 
omission was likely intentional, as treaty boundaries had shifted 
significantly westward. 
                                               
 302. Jackson passed the Indian Removal Act in violation of Supreme Court rulings 
that American Indian lands were protected by treaties.  Jackson’s aggressive relocation 
policies resulted in the mass displacement and forced resettlement of more than 
100,000 Indians.  For a discussion of the consequences of Indian removal policies in 
the United States, see T.S. Twibell, Rethinking Johnson v. M’intosh (1823):  The Root of 
the Continued Forced Displacement of American Indians Despite Cobell v. Norton (2001), 23 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 129, 153–54 (2008).  
 303. See § 1, § 4 Stat. at 729 (“That all that part of the United States west of the 
Mississippi, and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of 
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the Mississippi River, and not 
within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes 
of this act, be taken and deemed to be the Indian country.”). 
 304. See, e.g., United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021, 1024 (D.C.D. Or. 1872) (No. 
16,525) (holding that the 1834 definition of Indian country did not extend to Alaska 
because Alaska was not United States territory until 1868, but cautioning that the 
conclusion was made “with hesitation,” and “subject to correction” until Congress 
clarified the definition of Indian country); United States v. Ward, 28 F. Cas. 397, 398–
99 (C.C.D. Kans. 1863) (No. 16,639) (struggling to determine whether the 1834 Act 
applied to Indians residing in Kansas, which became a state after the passage of the 
Act); see also H.R. Rep. No. 23-474, at 4 (1834) (noting that the limits and extent of 
Indian country is difficult to determine with accuracy because of the various treaties 
since 1802 that adjusted its boundaries). 
 305. See generally 1 REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1878). 
 306. Id. at 369–70. 
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In Bates v. Clark,307 the Supreme Court grappled with this statutorily 
undefined “Indian country.”308  An Army officer had seized a shipment 
of alcohol, and the question presented was whether this occurred 
within the federal jurisdiction of “Indian country.”309  Justice Miller was 
undeterred by the lack of a specific definition and observed that 
“[n]otwithstanding the immense changes which [had] since taken 
place in the vast region covered by the act of 1834,” Congress had not 
changed the definition of Indian country nor changed the large body 
of laws governing the territory.310  From this, he reasoned that Congress 
intended for the definition of Indian Country to be adaptable to “the 
altered circumstances of what was then Indian country as to enable 
[Congress and the courts] to ascertain what it was at any time since then.”311 
The Court then adopted the territorial concept of Indian lands that 
was the constant in the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts from 1790 
to 1834:  “The simple criterion is that as to all the lands thus described 
it was Indian country whenever the Indian title had not been 
extinguished, and it continued to be Indian country so long as 
the Indians had title to it, and no longer.”312  
Congress soon created a different rule in the Major Crimes Act of 
1885.313  In a departure from previous Indian legislation, Congress did 
not define federal jurisdiction in terms of “Indian country.”  Instead, 
the Major Crimes Act was written to apply “within the limits of any 
Indian reservation,” including those “within the boundaries of any 
state.”314  With its zeal to punish Indian crime, Congress appears to 
have deliberately expanded the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction 
to include fee lands on Indian reservations.  By 1885, lands within many 
reservations were allotted to individual Indians in fee under the terms of 
treaties.315  Additionally, some reservation lands were granted to states 
                                               
 307. 95 U.S. 204 (1877). 
 308. See id. at 206–07 (explaining that, despite the addition of new states and territories, 
“Congress has not thought it necessary to make any new definition of Indian country” since 
the 1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, over forty years earlier). 
 309. Id. at 204–06. 
 310. Id. at 207. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 208. 
 313. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1153 (2012)). 
 314. Id. § 9, 23 Stat. at 385. 
 315. See Marc Slonim, Speech at Gonzaga University Law School Indian Law Lecture 
Series:  Indian Country, Indian Reservations, and the Importance of History in Indian Law 
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under federal land grants and for rights-of-way.316  Congress later 
incorporated this expanded boundary into the definition of “Indian 
country.” 
The General Allotment Act of 1887317 accelerated the process of 
transferring trust lands to fee status, cutting up reservations into 
individual allotments, opening the remainder to settlement, and 
granting citizenship to Indian people who received lands in fee.318  
Indian tribes lost more than ninety million acres, or two-thirds of tribal 
land base.319  In his 1901 inauguration address, President Roosevelt 
restated the vision for Indian allotment:  “The General Allotment Act 
is a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass . . . Under its 
provisions some sixty thousand Indians have already become citizens 
of the United States.”320  As the General Allotment Act began to run its 
course, legal questions began to arise about federal jurisdiction with 
the changing circumstances. 
These questions culminated in the controversial Supreme Court 
decision in In re Heff321 in 1905, which declared that Indians who were 
granted citizenship by the General Allotment Act were subject to state 
jurisdiction, and were not to receive the protections of federal criminal 
laws within Indian reservations.322  This was perhaps the nadir for the 
United States regarding the commitments made by the constitutional 
founders to the Indian tribes.  The decision caused significant controversy 
because Indian people were no longer protected by federal laws.  The 
Supreme Court soon cut back on Heff, reconsidering the text of the Major 
Crimes Act and Congress’s power under the Territory Clause. 
                                               
(Oct. 27, 2009), in 45 GONZ. L. REV. 517, 521–22, 524, 527 (2009–2010) (describing 
the progression of Indian land ownership from 1802–1903). 
 316. Id. at 524. 
 317. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). 
 318. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 8–10 (1995) 
(“Under the [General Allotment] Act, individual Indians received a certain number 
of acres in reservation land. . . .  [T]he allottee was expected to assimilate to 
agriculture, to Christianity, and to citizenship.”). 
 319. Slonim, supra note 315, at 522. 
 320. See Theodore Roosevelt’s First Annual Message, December 3, 1901, 35 Cong. 
Rec. 81, at 90 (1902). 
 321. 197 U.S. 488 (1905), overruled in part by United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916). 
 322. See id. at 50 (declaring that “when the United States grants the privileges of 
citizenship to an Indian, gives to him the benefit of and requires him to be subject to 
the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State, it places him outside the reach of police 
regulations on the part of Congress”). 
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B.    Celestine + Sandoval + Pelican = 18 USC § 1151(a)(b) and (c) 
In three cases, the Supreme Court settled the question of the scope 
of federal jurisdiction in Indian Country, and Congress codified their 
rulings into the current statutory definition of Indian Country.  The 
most important is United States v. Celestine.323 
Celestine is a lynchpin of contemporary federal Indian law.  Often 
cited in cases involving reservation diminishment,324 or the Indian 
canon of construction,325 its broader significance is generally 
unrecognized.  The impact of Celestine on federal Indian law is seen in 
a 1911 report to Congress from the Secretary of Interior.326  The report 
explained that after the decision in Heff, the “question of federal police 
jurisdiction over allotted Indian territories was up in the air.”  As an 
answer to that question, the report cited the Court’s holding in Celestine 
that “upheld the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts upon Indian 
allotments within an Indian reservation even though the allotment had 
been patented” as the answer to that question.327   
Consider if the Celestine Court had ruled the other way and 
continued to follow Heff.328  Kagama and its progeny had shifted the 
legal analysis away from federal territorial jurisdiction, and towards a 
notion of Indians as trust wards.329  As Indians became citizens under the 
allotment laws, the notion of Indian incompetency was not sustainable.330  
Under Heff, Indians who received allotments would be outside federal 
jurisdiction.331  State jurisdiction would have entered all allotted 
reservations, and reservation borders would have in effect vanished.  
Roosevelt’s vision of a “pulverizing engine” would have become reality.332 
                                               
 323. 215 U.S. 278 (1909). 
 324. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984). 
 325. See Richard B. Collins, Never Construed to Their Prejudice:  In Honor of David 
Getches, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 6, 8, 9, 21–22 (2013) (explaining the cannons, or 
different methods of judicial interpretation, in approaching ambiguities in federal 
statutes and treaties relating to the Indian nations). 
 326. See R.A. BALLINGER, LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR IN RESPONSE TO 
SENATE RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 13, 1911, S. DOC. NO. 61-707 (1911). 
 327. Id. at 13. 
 328. 197 U.S. 488 (1905).  Heff was later overturned in United States v. Nice, which 
relied on the principle from Celestine that federal jurisdiction was based on tribal land 
status.  See 241 U.S. 591, 601 (1916). 
 329. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1885). 
 330. See Royster, supra note 318, at 9–10. 
 331. See In re Heff, 197 U.S. at 509. 
 332. See Theodore Roosevelt’s First Annual Message, December 3, 1901, 35 Cong. 
Rec. 81, at 90 (1902). 
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In direct reliance on the Territory Clause, Celestine restored federal 
criminal authority in Indian country.  Justice Brewer wrote for a 
unanimous Court and began his analysis with the Territory Clause: 
By the second clause of [Section] 3, Art. IV, of the Constitution, to 
Congress, and to it alone, is given “power to dispose of and make all 
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other 
property belonging to the United States.”  From an early time in the 
history of the government, it has exercised this power, and has also 
been legislating concerning Indians occupying such territory.333 
Justice Brewer then explained the scope of federal jurisdiction 
under the Major Crimes Act as including “all land within the limits of 
any reservation”: 
[It] was decided, in Bates v. Clark . . . , that all the country described 
in the act as “Indian country” remains such “so long as the Indians 
retain their original title to the soil, and ceases to be Indian country 
whenever they lose that title, in the absence of any different 
provision by treaty or by act of Congress.” 
But the word “reservation” has a different meaning . . . .  The word is 
used in the land law to describe any body of land, large or small, which 
Congress has reserved from sale for any purpose.  It may be a military 
reservation, or an Indian reservation, or, indeed, one for any purpose 
for which Congress has authority to provide, and, when Congress has 
once established a reservation, all tracts included within it remain a part 
of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.334 
From Celestine, we can see how § 1151(a) of the Indian country 
definition was constructed:  all land “within the limits of any Indian 
reservation” is lifted directly from the text of what was then the Major 
Crimes Act.335  “Notwithstanding the issuance of any patent” is the 
holding in Celestine that Indian allotments are not excepted from the 
reservation.336  As stated by the Court:  “Although the defendant had 
received a patent for the land within that reservation, and although the 
murdered woman was the owner of another tract within such limits, 
                                               
 333. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 284 (1909). 
 334. Id. at 285 (citations omitted). 
 335. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012)). 
 336. Celestine, 215 U.S. at 278, 289–91.  At least one court has noted this derivation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) from Celestine.  See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 
1084 (D. Utah 1981) (noting that after Celestine, “[t]he courts continued to expand the 
definition of Indian country until 1948, when Congress codified these judicial 
expressions into statutory law as 18 U.S.C. § 1151”). 
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also patented, both tracts remained within the reservation until 
Congress excluded them therefrom.”337 
The Celestine Court relied on an important tax decision six years 
earlier, United States v. Rickert,338 which preempted state taxes within 
Indian country in direct reliance on the Territory Clause.339  A young 
Willis Van Devanter, who served as Assistant Attorney General for the 
Department of the Interior from 1897 to 1903, instituted the lawsuit 
and argued for the government.340  In 1903, President Roosevelt 
appointed Justice Van Devanter an appellate judge on the Eighth 
Circuit.341  President Taft nominated him for the Supreme Court, 
where he served from 1910 to 1937 and wrote many opinions 
addressing federal Indian law.342  Justice Van Devanter gained a deep 
understanding of both federal land law and Indian law long before he 
became a Justice.  Beginning with Rickert, Justice Van Devanter’s 
reasoning from the Territory Clause pervades the cases codified into 
the statutory definition of “Indian country.” 
Justice Van Devanter authored United States v. Sandoval,343 widely 
recognized as a landmark decision affirming the federally-protected 
status of tribal lands.  Here again, the citizenship of Indians did not 
prevent Congress from enacting laws to protect and benefit tribes.344  
Subsection (b) of the Indian country definition is a verbatim excerpt 
from Justice Van Devanter’s opinion: 
Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to 
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but long continued 
legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial 
decisions have attributed to the United States . . . the power and the 
duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent 
Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory 
or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits 
of a State.345 
                                               
 337. Celestine, 215 U.S. at 284. 
 338. 188 U.S. 432 (1903). 
 339. Id. at 439. 
 340. See Collins, supra note 325, at 29. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. at 30. 
 343. 231 U.S. 28 (1913). 
 344. See id. at 45–46. 
 345. Compare id. (emphasis added), with 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2012) (incorporating 
the emphasized language). 
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The Sandoval decision relied on the terms of the New Mexico 
Enabling Act346 which reserved Indian lands to federal jurisdiction.347  
The Enabling Act demonstrates the close relationship between 
creation of new states and reservation of federal lands contemplated 
in Article IV, Section 3.  Its language echoes the Territory Clause: 
That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare 
that they forever disclaim all right and title . . . to all lands lying 
within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes 
the right or title to which shall have been acquired through or from 
the United States or any prior sovereignty, and that until the title of 
such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same 
shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the 
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United 
States.348 
The Court in Sandoval cites Celestine and Rickert for the principle that 
federal jurisdiction is not based on citizenship, but on the federal 
status of Indian lands.349  The Sandoval Court also found that fee simple 
lands held communally by an Indian tribe are federal territory.350  
                                               
 346. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910). 
 347. See Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 36–37 (articulating the purposes of the Enabling Act, 
which included treating the lands of the Pueblo Indians as Indian country). 
 348. 36 Stat. at 569.  “Any prior sovereignty” is a reference to the 1848 transfer of 
lands from Mexico to the United States through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Mex.-
U.S., art. V, VII, IX, XI, May 30, 1848, 9 Stat. 922.  Under the laws of Spain and Mexico, 
Indian lands were similarly subject to a right of preemption.  See United States v. 
Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926).  Just as with the Treaty of Paris in 1783, this right 
of preemption transferred to the United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalago, while Indian tribes retained title.  See 9 Stat. at 930. 
 349. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 48.  
 350. The Court explained:  
[i]n other words, the lands are public lands of the pueblo, and so the situation 
is essentially the same as it was with the Five Civilized Tribes, whose lands, 
although owned in fee under patents from the United States, were adjudged 
subject to the legislation of Congress enacted in the exercise of the 
Government’s guardianship over those tribes and their affairs. 
See id. (citing United States v. Wright, 229 U.S. 226 (1913); Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 
640 (1912); Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912); Cherokee Nation v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488 
(1899)).  In United States v. Chavez, the Court again found that the Pueblo of Isleta’s 
“communal ownership of the full title in fee simple” is not an obstacle to federal 
protection of Indian lands.  See 290 U.S. 357, 363 (1933).  Patented fee title likewise 
does not undermine Indian country status of Creek Nation lands.  See United States v. 
Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109–11 (1935). 
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Sandoval is particularly significant because the lower court had relied 
on Heff to find that Pueblo lands were subject to state police jurisdiction 
and state taxation and land seizure along with “emancipation from 
federal control.”351  Celestine and Sandoval together marked a significant 
retreat from the assimilationist policies of the nineteenth century, and 
both were based on federal territorial authority in Indian country. 
The other source of § 1151(b) is United States v. McGowan.352  In 1917, 
the federal government purchased twenty acres near Reno, Nevada for 
three traditionally nomadic Indian tribes displaced by settlement.353  
The question was whether lands purchased for Indian tribes also fell 
within the scope of “Indian country.”354  After considering elements 
similar to those in Sandoval, the Court concluded:  “The Government 
retains title to the lands, which it permits the Indians to occupy.  The 
Government has authority to enact regulations and protective laws 
respecting this territory.”355 
Subsection 1151(c) of the Indian country definition includes “all 
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been 
extinguished.”356  This subsection derived from United States v. 
Pelican,357 where the Court upheld a federal indictment for a murder 
on an Indian allotment outside the boundaries of a reservation.358  The 
northern half of the Colville Indian Reservation had been “vacated and 
restored to the public domain.”359  However, tribal citizens residing on 
that portion of the reservation were entitled to trust allotments.360  The 
Court again relied on Celestine, finding that “the lands, being so held, 
continued to be under the jurisdiction and control of Congress.”361 
Both § 1151(a) and § 1151(c) include rights-of-way within a 
reservation or allotment.362  These are included on the basis of United 
States v. Soldana363 stating “it is clear that it was not the purpose of 
                                               
 351. United States v. Sandoval, 198 F. 539, 552–53 (D.N.M. 1912) (quoting In re 
Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 509 (1905)). 
 352. 302 U.S. 535 (1938). 
 353. Id. at 537. 
 354. Id. at 536. 
 355. Id. at 539. 
 356. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (2012). 
 357. 232 U.S. 442 (1914). 
 358. Id. at 451–52. 
 359. Id. at 445 (citing Act of July 1, 1892, chap. 140, 27 Stat. 62, 63 (1893)). 
 360. Id. at 449. 
 361. Id. at 447. 
 362. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), (c) (2012). 
 363. 246 U.S. 530 (1918). 
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Congress to extinguish the title of the Indians in the land comprised 
within the right of way.”364  In Minnesota v. United States,365 another case 
addressing rights of way, the Court explained, “the United States owns 
the fee of these parcels, the right of way cannot be condemned without 
making it a party.”366 
Each of the Supreme Court decisions used to construct the statutory 
definition of Indian country relies on authority from the Territory 
Clause.  A significant number of cases from this era built on the 
Territory Clause principles in Celestine and Rickert.367 
Justice Van Devanter retired in 1937, and the fertile period of 
Supreme Court decisions reasoning from the Territory Clause came to 
a close.  However, Congress picked up the torch. During the 
codification of Title 18 in 1948, the House Committee on the Revision 
of the Laws constructed the definition of Indian country from these 
territorial decisions, at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1946).  Although legislative 
history from this enormous codification project is limited, the 
provisions in the statute trace directly to quotations from both Celestine 
and Sandoval.  Legal digests from the era support the relationship 
between these decisions and the definition.  For example, the 1916 
edition of Ruling Case Law (the predecessor to American Jurisprudence) 
includes a section on “What is Indian country” citing prominently to 
Celestine, Sandoval, and Pelican.368 
In 1962, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1151 in Seymour v. 
Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary369 and, relying heavily on 
Celestine, confirmed federal jurisdiction over fee lands within 
reservation boundaries.370  Although the State argued that the words 
                                               
 364. Id. at 532–33. 
 365. 305 U.S. 382 (1939). 
 366. Id. at 386. 
 367. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 469–71 (1926); United States v. 
Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 440 (1926); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 
78, 88–90 (1918); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 600–01 (1916); United States v. 
Noble, 237 U.S. 74, 80–81 (1915); Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 486 (1914); 
United States v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 229 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1913); 
United States v. Wright, 229 U.S. 226, 234 (1913); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 673 
(1912); Clairmont v. United States, 225 U.S. 551, 557–58 (1912); Heckman v. United 
States, 224 U.S. 413, 436 (1912); Hallowell v. United States, 221 U.S. 317, 324 (1911); 
Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 309 (1911); United States v. Sutton, 215 U.S. 
291, 294–96 (1909). 
 368. 14 RULING CASE LAW § 33 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1916). 
 369. 368 U.S. 351 (1962). 
 370. Id. at 359. 
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“notwithstanding the issuance of any patent” in § 1151(a) should be 
interpreted as “notwithstanding the issuance of any patent to an 
Indian,” which would terminate federal jurisdiction on patents issued to 
non-Indians, the Court found that such an interpret would create “an 
impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction” that § 1151 sought to 
avoid.371  Instead, the Court reemphasized that all parts of a reservation 
remained under federal jurisdiction until removed by Congress.372 
Later cases interpreting the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian country frequently described the principle of federal authority 
in the language of territorial authority.  In United States v. Antelope,373 
the Indian defendants asserted a violation of equal protection where 
the federal murder statute did not require the same proof of 
premeditation as state law.374  Justice Brennan discounted the equal 
protection claims because defendants were “subjected to the same 
body of law as any other individual, Indian or non-Indian, charged with 
first-degree murder committed in a federal enclave.”375 
The status of the Mississippi Choctaw lands became the subject of 
United States v. John,376 where the Supreme Court made it clear that any 
lands placed into trust for an Indian tribe are Indian country.377  
Furthermore in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,378 the Court found 
that “Indian reservations are ‘a part of the territory of the United 
States,’” but held that Congress had not provided for Indian tribes to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.379  However, the Court 
anticipated Congress’s authority to do so:  “Finally, we are not unaware 
of the prevalence of non-Indian crime on today’s reservations which 
the tribes forcefully argue requires the ability to try non-Indians.  But 
                                               
 371. Id. at 358. 
 372. Id. 
 373. 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 
 374. Id. at 643–44. 
 375. Id. at 648. 
 376. 437 U.S. 634 (1978). 
 377. Id. at 649. (“The Mississippi lands in question here were declared by Congress 
to be held in trust by the Federal Government for the benefit of the Mississippi 
Choctaw Indians who were at that time under federal supervision.  There is no 
apparent reason why these lands, which had been purchased in previous years for the 
aid of those Indians, did not become a ‘reservation,’ at least for the purposes of federal 
criminal jurisdiction at that particular time.”). 
 378. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 379. Id. at 208–09, 211. 
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these are considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether 
Indian tribes should finally be authorized to try non-Indians.”380 
The most recent case was Lara, discussed above,381  where the 
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to tribal criminal authority over 
non-member Indians.382  Justice Breyer, writing for a seven justice 
majority, reaffirmed the role of the Territory Clause as one of the 
sources of Congress’s “broad” and “exclusive” powers “to legislate in 
respect to Indian tribes.”383  Thus, the principles of the Territory Clause 
are embedded in contemporary Supreme Court decisions affecting 
federal and tribal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. 
III.    INDIAN COUNTRY IS FEDERALLY PROTECTED TRIBAL TERRITORY 
This Part returns to the primary basis for contending that the 
Territory Clause is authority for federal laws in Indian country—
structure.  It briefly examines the federal title interest in Indian lands 
as well as common legal principles shared with other federal lands 
regarding land transactions, water rights, criminal law, as well as 
federal jurisdiction over matters on fee inholdings and adjacent lands. 
A.    Federal Title Interest in Indian Lands 
The status of Indian lands as federal territory is self-evident.  The 
federal government in fact holds a title interest in Indian lands.384  The 
first principle of property law is that property is a bundle of rights, 
frequently divided among different parties.385  This is the case with 
Indian lands.  The Indian tribe holds the original Indian title, 
sometimes known as aboriginal title, or right of occupancy.386  The 
                                               
 380. Id. at 212. 
 381. See supra notes 29–33, 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 382. 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004). 
 383. Id. at 200 (quotation marks omitted).  Lara thus resolved an issue, debated in 
academic circles, about whether Indian trust lands “belong[] to the United States,” 
within the meaning of the Territory Clause.  See infra Section IV (discussing the 
evolution of FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW in its treatment of the 
Territory Clause). 
 384. See supra note 74 and accompanying discussion. 
 385. See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 
712–14 (1996). 
 386. The Supreme Court found “their right of occupancy is considered as sacred as 
the fee simple of whites.”  Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835).  “Trust” 
and “restricted fee” are often used interchangeably and are essentially synonyms, as a 
“restraint on alienation” is a trust provision that prohibits or penalizes alienation of 
the trust corpus.  See Restraint on Alienation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
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United States holds an interest in Indian land title known as the right 
of preemption or alienation.387  This is the origin of the land title 
system in the United States and the reason that property law textbooks 
have included Johnson v. M’Intosh388 for generations.  “The ceded 
territory was occupied by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians; but 
the exclusive right of the United States to extinguish their title, and to 
grant the soil, has never, we believe, been doubted.”389 
The Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged the federal title 
interest in Indian land.  In The New York Indians,390 the Court voided a 
state tax on reservation lands of the Seneca Nation.391  The Court 
explained that “the Indian right of occupancy creates an indefeasible 
title to the reservations that may extend from generation to 
generation, and will cease only by the dissolution of the tribe, or their 
consent to sell to the party possessed of the right of pre-emption.”392  
More than a century later, in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,393 
the Court unanimously restated this principle.394 
The bedrock source of the federal interest in Indian land is the 
restriction on alienation found in the Indian Trade and Intercourse 
Act—also known as the Nonintercourse Act.395  This was one of the first 
laws passed in 1790 at the insistence of President Washington, and it 
remains federal law.396  The text of the statute prohibits any taking of 
title to Indian land that is not made pursuant to the Constitution 
                                               
Tribal lands are better termed as federal territory rather than property of the United 
States.  The tribes hold full possession and occupancy, while the United States asserts 
a right of preemption combined with a right to govern.  See Michael C. Blumm, Why 
Aboriginal Title is a Fee Simple Absolute, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV., 975, 983–85 (2011). 
 387. Blumm, supra note 386, at 983–85. 
 388. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 389. Id. at 586. 
 390. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866). 
 391. Id. at 771. 
 392. Id. at 771. 
 393. 414 U.S. 661 (1974). 
 394. Id. at 667 (“It very early became accepted doctrine in this Court that although fee 
title to the lands occupied by Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the 
sovereign—first the discovering European nation and later the original States and the 
United States—a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized.”). 
 395. Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012)). 
 396. See Department of Justice, General Information:  Environment and Natural 
Resources Division, Congress Passes the First Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST. (May 14, 2015), www.justice.gov/enrd/timeline-event/congress-passes-first-
indian-trade-and-intercourse-act (mandating that Congress first ratify any conveyance 
of Indian interests in land). 
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through treaty or conventions.397  “We emphasize what is obvious, that 
the ‘trust relationship’ we affirm has as its source the Nonintercourse 
Act, meaning that the trust relationship pertains to land transactions 
which are or may be covered by the Act, and is rooted in rights and 
duties encompassed or created by the Act.”398 
The United States acquired its territory through land cessions from 
foreign nations, subject to the land titles of the indigenous peoples.399  
Throughout U.S. history, western settlement has followed a pattern of 
Indian land cessions leading to establishment of federal territories and 
then admission of new states.  Congress documented this history in 
painstaking detail in 1884, with the publication of Thomas 
Donaldson’s report, The Public Domain:  Its History, with Statistics.400  
Both Donaldson and Cohen emphasize that purchase of Indian title 
was always the first step.401  “From the organization of the National 
Government, it has been the rule of the Nation to purchase the occupancy 
right from the Indians . . . .  The Government has never attempted to survey 
and dispose of lands prior to their cession by the Indians.”402 
Importantly, this is not only a history of land cessions; it is a history of 
federal land reservations, which continue to serve as homelands for 
Indian Nations.  Indian land cessions and land reservations are two 
sides of the same coin under the federal land laws.  Since 1790, the 
United States has maintained records for every cession and every 
reservation of land from an Indian tribe.403  In the official records of 
Congress, United States Serial Set Number 4015 includes two tables entitled:  
                                               
 397. See 25 U.S.C. § 177. 
 398. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st 
Cir. 1975); see also CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE 
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES:  CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 
355 (1886) (“The right of alienation is as much a vested right as the right of possession 
or the right of enjoyment . . . .”). 
 399. See Cohen, supra note 72, at 33–36, 50–51 (providing case examples, such as Spanish 
grants for the Louisiana Territory were “subject to the rights of Indian occupancy”). 
 400. DONALDSON, supra note 74, at 240. 
 401. See generally Cohen, supra note 72 (discussing at length the misunderstood 
process through which the United States received land from the Indians); DONALDSON, 
supra note 74, at 240. 
 402. See DONALDSON, supra note 74, at 240. 
 403. See Indian Land Cessions in the United States, 1784–1894:  United States Serial Set, 
No. 4015, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwss-ilc.html 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (detailing the United States Congressional Serial Set and 
providing information on the House and Senate Documents and Reports within). 
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(1) Schedule of Treaties and Acts of Congress Authorizing Allotments of 
Lands in Severalty, and (2) Schedule of Indian Land Cessions.404 
In the broader context of federal land law, “there are three types of 
reserved federal lands:  military, public, and Indian.”405  Just like other 
federal reservations, the vast majority of tribal lands do not have land 
patents or deeds; they are reserved under treaty, executive order, or 
federal statute prior to any land disposition.406  Approximately 56.2 
million acres of Indian land are reserved, held in trust, or subject to the 
restriction on alienation.407  Most reservations are the remainder of a 
tribe’s original land base, though many others were created from the 
public domain for tribes who were displaced from their homelands.408 
Federal title in Indian land is embedded in current practice at the 
Department of the Interior, which maintains millions of title 
records.409  The Division of Land Titles and Records at the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs in the Department of the Interior has twelve regional 
offices, 156 employees, and an annual budget of approximately $16 
million.410  It exists solely to maintain federal title in Indian land, and 
has been doing so since the nineteenth century.411  It “is the office of 
record for the recording of Indian land title documents, for the 
                                               
 404. Id.  The Schedule of Indian Land Cessions table “[i]ndicat[es] the number 
and location of each cession by or reservation for the Indian tribes from the 
organization of the Federal Government to and including 1894, together with 
descriptions of the tracts so ceded or reserved, the date of the treaty, law or executive 
order governing the same, the name of the tribe or tribes affected thereby, and 
historical data and references bearing thereon.”  See Schedule of Indian Land Cessions, 
Libr. of Congress, https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llss&fileName= 
4000/4015/llss4015.db&recNum=129 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 405. DON PHILPOTT, UNDERSTANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 128 (2016). 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. 
 409. See DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANUAL, Part 51, 
ch. 2, 1–3 (2012) [hereinafter BIAM PART 51].  “Indian land,” as used by the BIA 
Division of Land Titles and Records, “is an inclusive term describing all real property 
or land . . . held in trust by the United States for individual Indians or tribes, or all 
lands, titles to which are held by individual Indians or tribes, subject to Federal 
restrictions against alienation or encumbrance, or all lands which are subject to the 
rights of use, occupancy and/or benefit of certain tribes” collectively, and “include[s] 
land for which the title is held in fee simple status by Indian tribes” where subject to 
the federal restriction on alienation.  Id. at 3. 
 410. Budget Justifications and Performance Information Fiscal Year 2017:  Indian Affairs, 
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, IA-RES-7 https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/ 
FY2017_IA_Budget_Justification.pdf [hereinafter 2017 Budget Justifications]. 
 411. BIAM PART 51, supra note 409, ch. 4 at 1. 
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maintenance of the chain-of-title, and the examination, reporting, and 
certification of land title [and encumbrance] for Indian trust and 
restricted [fee] lands.”412  
B.    Common Legal Principles Shared with Other Federal Lands 
Tribal lands are distinct, but share features with other federal lands.  
First, federal land title records are found in the Department of the 
Interior.  Tribal leaders sometimes question why the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs is housed within the Department of the Interior, along with 
“rocks and trees.”  It is because the Department’s original purpose was 
to manage federal lands, and the lands managed by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs are the remainder or “reservations” from the vast 
landscape of tribal lands subjected to nearly two centuries of 
acquisition, survey, platting and sale by the federal government.413  The 
Department also runs the Bureau of Land Management, the National 
Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Geological Survey, Bureau 
of Reclamation, and the Office of Surface Mining and Insular Affairs 
(U.S. island territories).414  The commonality among these government 
agencies is that all manage federal lands with authority derived from 
the Territory Clause, and are the offspring of the General Land 
Office.415  Although tribal lands have a unique purpose to serve as tribal 
homelands, many aspects of federal Indian law are comparable to 
other federal land laws.  The similarities are most pronounced with 
land transactions, taxation, water rights, criminal law, and regulation 
of non-federal inholdings. 
Congress and the Department of the Interior exercise extensive 
propriety control over Indian land. Large sections of Title 25 of the 
U.S. Code are devoted to exercising the federal trustee’s control of 
Indian lands.  The Secretary of Interior is required to approve all leases 
and to approve any right of way, any sale of hard rock minerals, timber, 
                                               
 412. Id. 
 413. PHILIP S. DELORIA, ET AL., REPORT ON FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF 
INDIAN AFFAIRS:  FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION 45–46 
(1976).  This is not to say that Indian Affairs should remain in the Department of the 
Interior.  For many years, tribal leaders have been considering new administrative 
structures.  See id. at 49–50. 
 414. See Bureaus, DEP’T. OF INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/bureaus (last visited Oct. 
17, 2018). 
 415. See MALCOLM J. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS:  THE SETTLEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS, 1789–1837 55, 62 (1968); GEORGE C. 
COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 26 (2014). 
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oil and gas, use of land for housing, and agriculture.416  In recent years, 
Indian tribes have gained somewhat greater self-determination over 
land management through laws such as the HEARTH Act, but even here 
tribal regulations are approved by the Secretary of Interior and lease 
terms are limited.417  The Bureau of Indian Affairs had a budget of over 
$137 million for realty services in Indian country in its 2017 fiscal year.418 
Indian lands are immune from state taxation because of their status as 
federal lands.  As previously discussed, Rickert found that the tax immunity 
stems from the Territory Clause,419  and that “no authority exists for the 
state to tax lands which are held in trust by the United States for the 
purpose of carrying out its policy in reference to these Indians.”420  Rickert 
is the cited authority for the string of modern cases pre-empting state 
taxation of tribal lands and improvements on those lands.421 
The Winters doctrine states that reserved water rights spring from the 
same source for Indian reservations and all other federal lands.422  In 
1908, the Supreme Court held that the right to use non-navigable 
waters flowing through the Fort Berthold Reservation in Montana was 
impliedly reserved by the government and the Tribe in the treaty 
establishing the reservation.423  In 1963, in Arizona v. California,424 the 
Supreme Court expanded the Winters Doctrine as the source of all 
federally-reserved water rights for all federal lands, whether a wildlife 
refuge or National Park, in an amount intended to fulfill for the 
purposes of the reservation.425  For non-navigable waters, the Court 
                                               
 416. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 311–28 (2012) (rights-of-way); § 415(a) (leases of restricted 
lands); § §§ 2102–08 (mineral resources); §§ 3101–20 (national Indian forest 
resources management); §§ 3501–06 (Indian energy); §§ 3701–46 (American Indian 
agricultural resource management); §§ 4101–17 (Native American housing assistance 
and self-determination). 
 417. § 415(h). 
 418. See 2017 Budget Justifications, supra note 410, at IA-ST-2. 
 419. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 439 (1903) (citing Wisconsin Cent. R.R. 
Co. v. Price Cty., 133 U.S. 496, 504 (1890)). 
 420. Id. at 441. 
 421. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Mescalero Apache Tribe 
v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 158 (1973); Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. 
Thurston Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 724 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 422. See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
 423. Id. at 575–77. 
 424. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
 425. See id. at 599–602; see also Harold A. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew:  
Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 BYU L. REV. 639, 647–49 (1975). 
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cited the Territory Clause as the source of power of the United States 
“to reserve water rights for its reservations and its property.”426 
Congress asserts and maintains police power in the Indian country, 
just as it does for other federal lands.427  Although some Indian country 
crimes are unique,428 many prosecutions entail the same federal 
criminal laws that apply to all other federal lands.429  Since 1817, the 
Indian Country Crimes Act has extended all of the federal enclave 
criminal laws to Indian country, with an exception for crimes 
committed by one Indian against another.430  Moreover, since 1825, 
the Department of Justice has prosecuted crimes in Indian country 
under the Assimilative Crimes Act,431 which adopts state criminal laws 
where there is no corresponding federal crime.432 
Finally, Indian reservations and other federal reservations, like 
national parks, often include privately owned fee lands within their 
boundaries.433  Federal jurisdiction over private inholdings is familiar 
terrain for federal land law.  In Minnesota v. Block,434 the Eighth Circuit 
upheld federal police jurisdiction over private lands in a wilderness 
area when reasonably related to the purpose of the reservation.435  In 
Celestine, the Supreme Court similarly found everything included in a 
reservation—military, Indian, or otherwise—remains part of that 
                                               
 426. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 597–98; see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 
(1976) (“Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, 
§ 8, which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property Clause, 
Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation of federal lands.  The doctrine applies to 
Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in navigable 
and nonnavigable streams.”). 
 427. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151–52 (2012). 
 428. § 1151 et. seq. (2012). 
 429. See, e.g., § 1153(a) (explaining that an Indian charged with committing a 
number of crimes within Indian country, including murder, kidnapping, and other 
felonies, “shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing 
any of the [listed] offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States”). 
 430. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 2, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012)) (excluding “any offence [sic] committed by one Indian 
against another, within any Indian boundary”). 
 431. See Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 65, § 3, 4 Stat. 115 (1825) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 13 (2012)). 
 432. Id.; see also Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 713 (1946) (emphasizing 
that “many sections of the Federal Criminal Code apply to the reservation,” including 
those covered by the Assimilative Crimes Act). 
 433. See Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”:  The Property Clause 
and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2001). 
 434. 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 435. Id. at 1244, 1249–51. 
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reservation once established by Congress. Celestine relied directly on 
the Territory Clause and was confirmed by Solem v. Bartlett.436  The 
entire boundary set by Congress will remain a reservation until it is 
explicitly made otherwise, regardless of any individual titles within, 
because Congress alone can modify the boundaries of a reservation.437  
In 2016, the Supreme Court affirmed this principle with a unanimous 
opinion in Nebraska v. Parker.438 
The text of the Territory Clause broadly authorizes Congress to 
make needful rules and regulations “respecting” the territory or other 
property belonging to the United States.439  This authority includes 
extra-territorial matters, so long as the federal government 
demonstrates a nexus between the rule or regulation and the 
protected federal territory.440  For this reason, the Territory Clause 
should be considered as authority for a broad range of matters 
affecting Indian tribes.  The federal government has adopted a trust 
responsibility to protect tribal lands not only as a natural resource, but 
more importantly as homelands for tribal cultures and tribal self-
government.  As a result, the Territory Clause provides Congress with 
extensive power to protect Indian tribes even on matters that arise 
outside of reservation boundaries. 
IV.    OMISSION FROM REVISED EDITIONS OF THE  
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
It is important to acknowledge, and respectfully challenge, the 
position that recent editions of the Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law have taken on the Territory Clause.441  Cohen’s Handbook is the 
fundamental treatise on federal Indian law, first published in 1941 by 
                                               
 436. 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
 437. Id. at 470 (citing United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909)). 
 438. 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).  In this case, the State challenged a tribal liquor tax as 
it applied to the Village of Pender, which is inside reservations boundaries but 
generally in private ownership.  Id. at 1077–78.  The Supreme Court sustained the 
Omaha Tribe’s argument that the reservation has not been diminished through 
changes in ownership patterns.  Id. at 1087–88. 
 439. See supra Section I.D. 
 440. See, e.g., United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 266–67 (1927); Camfield v. United 
States, 167 U.S. 518, 528 (1897).  See generally Appel, supra note 433 (discussing the 
extraterritorial power extensively and the required nexus the government must show). 
 441. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton 
ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012)]; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton 2005) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2005)]. 
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the Department of Interior.442  In 1982, a group of law professors 
published a significantly revised version of Cohen’s Handbook, reporting 
that the content was “updated, reorganized, and rewritten, but the 
abiding principles of Indian law have changed little since Cohen so 
carefully articulated them.”443  Although Cohen’s original work 
recognized the continuing role of the Territory Clause in federal 
Indian law, the revised editions note only a historical purpose.444 
The analysis in the revised Cohen’s Handbook may be incorrect, 
beginning with the legal history of the term “Indian country.”  The 
2012 edition of Cohen’s Handbook states that Congress relied on Donnelly 
v. United States445 for the definition in § 1151(a), “all land within the 
limits of any Indian reservation,” and states that the wording comes 
from the Major Crimes Act.446  Donnelly is an important case because it 
clarified that Executive Order reservations are included within the 
term “Indian country.”447  But Donnelly is not a Major Crimes Act 
decision.  The defendant was a non-Indian, the prosecution was under 
the Indian Country Crimes Act, and the decision construed the then-
undefined term “Indian country.”448  Donnelly considered the Major 
Crimes Act only to reject an ancillary argument raised by the defendant 
and is not authority for anything related to the phrase “[all land] 
within the limits of any Indian reservation.”449 
Instead, this primary definition of “Indian country” was derived from 
the much more important and earlier Supreme Court decision in 
Celestine.  As discussed, Celestine was the landmark decision citing the 
Territory Clause as the source of authority to include all land “within 
the limits of any Indian reservation.”450  Celestine is also cited authority 
                                               
 442. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at vii. 
 443. FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW x (Rennard Strickland ed., 
1982) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1982)]. 
 444. Compare FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 94–97, 310–11 
(Dep’t. of Interior 1941) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1941)], with COHEN’S HANDBOOK 
(2012), supra note 441, at 384–86 (briefly discussing and noting that the property clause of 
Article IV is one of the powers that “[has] played a significant role historically”). 
 445. 228 U.S. 243 (1913). 
 446. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 190. 
 447. See 228 U.S. at 256–59. 
 448. Id. at 252, 254, 269. 
 449. Id. at 269–70. 
 450. 215 U.S. 278, 283–85 (1909). 
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in Sandoval, Pelican and Seymour.451  In this way, the revised Cohen’s 
Handbook misconstrued the legal history and missed the constitutional 
source of the term “Indian country.” 
The revised editions also stand in contrast to Cohen’s original work.  
The 1941 edition—written before the definition of “Indian country” 
was created in 1948—contains an extensive discussion of federal power 
in a subsection titled “United States Territory and Property.”452  The 
discussion of tribal lands begins by acknowledging that “[t]he control 
by Congress of tribal lands has been one of the most fundamental 
expressions, if not the major expression, of the constitutional power of 
Congress over Indian affairs.”453  Cohen’s analysis of plenary power and 
Kagama is placed within this section devoted to U.S. territorial power 
and stresses the constitutional limitations created by the trust 
responsibility.454  Cohen cites Justice Van Devanter:  “Our decisions, 
while recognizing that the government has power to control and 
manage the property and affairs of its Indian wards in good faith for 
their welfare, show that this power is subject to constitutional 
limitations and does not enable the government to give the lands of 
one tribe or band to another, or to deal with them as its own.”455 
Unlike Cohen’s original work, the 1982 edition includes only a brief 
mention of the Territory Clause, commenting that it is no longer 
considered to be an important source of federal power in Indian 
country.456  When did the status of tribal lands change?  It does not say.  
Instead, the 1982 edition works to distinguish tribal lands from public 
lands, stating that “Indian property, however, is more properly 
classified as private property.”457  Cohen would never have written that 
sentence.  In fact, in 1941, Cohen wrote, “Actually, we find that tribal 
property partakes of some of the incidents of both individual private 
property and public property of the United States,” at the outset of his 
chapter on tribal property rights.458  The revised editions also elevate 
                                               
 451. See Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. St. Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 359 
(1962); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 447, 451 (1914); United States v. Sandoval, 
231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913). 
 452. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1941), supra note 444, at 94. 
 453. Id. 
 454. Id. at 95–96. 
 455. Id. at 96 (citing Chippewa Indians of Minn. v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 375–
76 (1937)). 
 456. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1982), supra note 443, at 209. 
 457. Id. at 210. 
 458. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1941), supra note 444, at 287. 
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plenary power to a separate subsection, detached from the limitations 
created by the federal trust responsibility.459  Cohen’s more careful, 
contextual analysis places tribal territory, federal power, and the trust 
obligation together in a relationship.460 
The more recent 2005 and 2012 editions of Cohen’s Handbook dismiss 
the Territory Clause even more succinctly as historically relevant only 
to “activities in the territories prior to statehood.”461  This antebellum 
view462 of the Territory Clause has been long abandoned.463  The 
revised Cohen’s Handbook also states that “[u]nless the land taken into 
trust originated as public land, however, the property clause cannot be 
the source of power.”464  This statement confuses the Enclave Clause 
with the Territory Clause. 
The Enclave Clause requires state consent and has a limited 
purpose:  exclusive federal jurisdiction for the seat of federal 
government and for military bases.465  The Territory Clause applies 
                                               
 459. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 381–82. 
 460. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1941), supra note 444, at 96. 
 461. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 385; COHEN’S HANDBOOK 
(2005), supra note 441, at 392. 
 462. In 1846, Chief Justice Taney’s decision in United States v. Rogers stated that Congress 
has authority over tribal lands under the Territory Clause only “where the country occupied 
by them is not within the limits of one of the States.”  45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846).  Eleven years 
later, Justice Taney went further in Dred Scott v. Sandford and found the Territory Clause 
“cannot, by any just rule of interpretation, be extended to territory which the new 
Government might afterwards obtain from a foreign nation.”  60 U.S. 393, 442 (1857), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend XIV.  The Kagama decision in 1886 
returned to Taney’s assertion in Rogers that the Territory Clause did not apply within the 
boundaries of a state, then found the power “not so much from the clause in the Constitution 
in regard to disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning the territory and other 
property of the United States, as from the ownership of the country in which the territories 
are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the national government, and 
can be found nowhere else.”  118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886).  The Kagama construction of plenary 
power was developed in reaction to an antebellum conception of the Territory Clause, driven 
at least in part by the nation’s conflict over slavery and the Missouri Compromise.  See Appel, 
supra note 433, at 36–57 (discussing the largely disregarded narrow reading of the Property 
Clause in the Dred Scott case). 
 463. See, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535–37 (1911) (rejecting most 
forcefully the narrow view of the Territory Clause); see also CHARLES F. WILKINSON, 
CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN:  LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST, 223–30, 
240–42 (1992) (offering expert perspectives on public lands and reservations, 
including discussions on legal history and development of land regulations). 
 464. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 385. 
 465. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o exercise 
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District . . . as may, by Cession of 
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government 
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more broadly to any territory or other property “belonging to the 
United States.”466  Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, 
noted the limited nature of the Enclave Clause:  “The public money 
expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, 
and the nature of the military duties . . . all demand, that they should 
be exempted from state authority.”467  Justice Story also explained the 
broader reach of the Territory Clause:  “The power is not confined to 
the territory of the United States; but extends to ‘other property 
belonging to the United States;’ so that it may be applied to the due 
regulation of all other personal and real property rightfully belonging to the 
United States.  And so it has been constantly understood, and acted upon.”468 
State consent to federal jurisdiction over all federal lands, including 
Indian lands, was frequently included as a disclaimer in state enabling 
acts, particularly after 1881 when the Supreme Court’s United States v. 
McBratney469 decision reserved the question of whether federal jurisdiction 
continued after statehood.470  Because state consent is a constitutional 
requirement for the Enclave Clause, there is often confusion over 
whether public lands are governed under the Enclave Clause or the 
Territory Clause.  The revised Cohen’s Handbook discusses these Enabling 
Act provisions as progeny of Worcester v. Georgia,471 but fails to recognize 
that these are reservations of authority under the Territory Clause.472 
                                               
of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the 
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of 
Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .”). 
 466. Under the Territory Clause, states retain concurrent jurisdiction over matters 
that do not interfere with the federal purpose of the land.  See Utah Power & Light Co. 
v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 404 (1917).  On tribal lands, state jurisdiction is very 
limited.  Draper v. United States and United States v. McBratney are examples where the 
states retain jurisdiction in Indian country over crimes not involving Indians.  See 
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 241–44, 247 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 
104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). 
 467. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:  
WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND 
STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 1224, at 131 (Melville M. 
Bigelow, 5th ed. 1994). 
 468. Id. § 1325, at 204. 
 469. 104 U.S. 621 (1881). 
 470. Id. at 623–24. 
 471. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 472. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 500; COHEN’S HANDBOOK 
(1982), supra note 443, at 268.  Although the decision in Worcester does not reference 
the Territory Clause directly, it uses the term “Indian territory” and confirms the 
federal title interest in Indian land.  31 U.S. at 557.  “Their right of occupancy has 
never been questioned, but the fee in the soil has been considered in the government.  
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These provisions in the statehood acts demonstrate the link between 
the dual purpose of Article IV, Section 3—to admit new states while 
retaining federal jurisdiction over Indian land and other federal lands.  
In each instance, the language echoes the text of the Territory 
Clause—to dispose of and to regulate.  Although the Enabling Acts are 
strong evidence of congressional intent to reserve Territory Clause 
jurisdiction, the Court has found them unnecessary because they 
simply confirm the status of the land as federal territory or property.473 
There are other issues with the revised Cohen’s Handbook.  The history 
chapter does not include the western land cessions of the original 
states, the purpose of the Northwest Ordinance, or the Territory 
Clause.474  The tribal lands chapter could clarify that the federal 
restriction on alienation of Indian lands is the source of both federal 
power and responsibilities under the Territory Clause.475 
The revised Cohen’s Handbooks’ omissions may be a product of 
reliance on Professor Newton’s brilliant and oft-cited article on federal 
power in Indian affairs, which argued the “Court never developed the 
property clause as a principle basis of [c]ongressional power.”476  The 
role of the Territory Clause is not so much undeveloped as it is deeply 
embedded in federal Indian law, buried under elaborate constructions 
of precedent rather than citations to constitutional authority.  The 
burial was aided by the spotty legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1151, the 
tendency of historians to overlook the role of Indian tribes in early U.S. 
history, and the federal desire to seize power without the 
responsibilities to tribal lands and peoples.  To Professor Newton’s 
credit, much of the research in this article would have been impossible 
without access to searchable databases of historic documents, or exposure 
to the practices of the federal Indian land title system. These observations 
are offered in a collaborative spirit to encourage reconsideration of the 
Territory Clause within the subject of federal Indian law. 
                                               
This may be called the right to the ultimate domain, but the Indians have a present 
right of possession.”  Id. at 580 (M’lean, J., concurring). 
 473. See, e.g., Van Brocklin v. Anderson, 117 U.S. 151, 164–65 (1886) (discussing the 
opinions of two eminent constitutional scholars, Stephen Douglas and Daniel Webster, 
as to the power of states over federal land held under the Territory Clause). 
 474. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 3–108 (dedicating a 
chapter to the history and development of U.S. policy surrounding American Indians 
from 1492 to present, yet failing to discuss land cessions, the purpose of the Northwest 
Ordinance, or the Territory Clause). 
 475. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 17–23 (noting the omission of 
key elements from early U.S. and Indian history and policy). 
 476. Newton, supra note 18, at 210 n.73. 
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V.    IMPLICATIONS OF RESTORING THE ORIGINAL MEANING 
 OF THE TERRITORY CLAUSE 
Renewed recognition of the Territory Clause may help to restore 
cohesion to an area of federal law that is frequently difficult to 
reconcile, and addresses many questions and problems with “plenary 
power.”  Just like other federal lands, Congress makes “needful rules 
and regulations” to promote the federal purpose of lands belonging to 
the United States.477  For Indian Nations and tribal lands, the federal 
purpose is to hold self-governing native homelands aside from state 
settlement and control.478  This was the original intention of the 
Founders and is an uninterrupted use of the Territory Clause.479 
There are other implications of renewed recognition of the 
Territory Clause, but this Article will briefly mention four.  The first is 
the role of inherent tribal sovereignty within the text of the 
Constitution; the second regards the role of state law within Indian 
country; the third suggests reconsideration of Kagama; and the fourth 
looks towards future legislation that will improve public safety and 
support tribal government self-determination. 
A.    Tribal Sovereignty within the Structure of the Constitution 
Justice Thomas will not be surprised by this proposed source of 
federal power in Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2.  In Lara, he suggested 
as much.480  However, because other federal territories such as Puerto 
Rico are considered an instrumentality of the United States for double 
jeopardy purposes, Justice Thomas questions whether Indian tribes 
can be both separate sovereigns and subject to the Territory Clause.481  
The history of the Territory Clause provides an answer to this question 
about the source of tribal authority and constitutional structure. 
In United States v. Wheeler,482 the Court held that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not bar the prosecution of an Indian in a federal court 
when he had previously been convicted in a tribal court of an offense 
arising out of the same incident.483  The Court distinguished between 
                                               
 477. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 478. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 479. See supra notes 267–269 and accompanying text. 
 480. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 225–26 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that the source of congressional power over Indians might be found within 
the Territory Clause). 
 481. Id. 
 482. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
 483. Id. at 332. 
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tribal governments and other territorial governments such as Puerto 
Rico and Guam:  “Before the coming of the Europeans, the tribes were 
self-governing sovereign political communities.484  In contrast, a 
territorial government is not acting as an independent political 
community but as “an agency of the federal government.”485 
Wheeler was recently confirmed by the Supreme Court in Puerto Rico v. 
Sanchez Valle486 in a decision that drew attention to this distinction between 
inherent and delegated authority.  As Justice Kagan explained, a 
territorial government derives its authority as a delegation from the 
federal government.487  Conversely, Indian country is a federal territory 
reserved for an Indian tribe to exercise inherent authority that has existed 
since time immemorial.488 
There is no doubt that Washington and Knox thought of Indian tribes as 
sovereign governments.  In July of 1789, two months after Washington’s 
inauguration, Knox wrote to President Washington with his plan for Indian 
affairs:  “The independent nations and tribes of [I]ndians ought to be 
considered as foreign nations, not as the subjects of any particular state.”489  
Two months later, President Washington wrote to the Senate:  “It doubtless 
is important that all treaties and compacts formed by the United States with 
other nations whether civilized or not, should be made with caution, and 
executed with fidelity.”490  Washington went on to urge Congress to ratify 
“the treaties with certain Indian nations.”491  These are but a few, but in the 
correspondence among the Framers, there are hundreds of references to 
Indian Nations.492 
                                               
 484. Id. at 322–23 (citations omitted). 
 485. Id. at 321 (citing Domenech v. Nat’l City Bank, 294 U.S. 199, 204–05 (1935). 
 486. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1876–77 (2016) (upholding 
the precedent that double jeopardy attaches with respect to prosecutions in Puerto 
Rico because it is not a separate sovereign). 
 487. Id. at 1873, n.5. 
 488. See id. at 1872 (noting that tribal power is a “pre-existing” sovereign power that 
exists separate from federal authority). 
 489. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (Jul. 7, 1789), FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-03-02-0067 (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 490. Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate (Sep. 17, 1789), 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-
0032 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 491. Id. 
 492. The National Archives website Founders Online, http://founders.archives.gov, is 
repository of the correspondence and other writings of the major participants in the 
framing of the Constitution.  A search for the term “Indian Nation” reveals 159 uses.  The 
two terms occur near each other 896 times. 
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The original purpose of the Territory Clause was to prevent crime 
and violence on the western Indian frontier.493  Washington and Knox 
recognized tribal inherent jurisdiction over territory but wanted to 
limit violent conflicts.494  The intent of the Territory Clause was to 
harmonize the expansionist drive of settlers with the existence of tribal 
territory by regulating both non-Indians who threatened the peace and the 
manner in which Indian tribes exercised their inherent local powers.495 
The 1896 Supreme Court decision in Talton v. Mayes496 reflects this 
understanding of the relationship between inherent tribal sovereignty 
and federal territorial authority.  The defendant challenged his 
conviction where the Cherokee tribal court provided only five grand 
jury members.497  The Court held the Fifth Amendment guarantee of 
indictment by grand jury inapplicable to tribal courts:  “But the 
existence of the right in [C]ongress to regulate the manner in which 
the local powers of the Cherokee Nation shall be exercised does not 
render such local powers federal powers arising from and created by 
the Constitution of the United States.”498 
In this way, the Supreme Court recognized inherent tribal 
sovereignty as separate from the authority of Congress to regulate the 
manner of its exercise.  As in other federal territories, civil rights are 
protected by federal statute and not through direct application of the 
Constitution.  The Indian Civil Rights Act imposes meaningful due 
process constraints on tribal courts, and the right of federal habeas 
corpus review in federal courts, while maintaining tribal court 
independence and traditions.499  This structure is as old as the 
Constitution, respectful of tribal sovereignty, and affords flexibility for 
Congress to accommodate changing needs. 
                                               
 493. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 494. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 495. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 496. 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
 497. Id. at 378–79. 
 498. Id. at 384. 
 499. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2012); see also United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 
1962, 1966 (2016) (summarizing the due process and habeas requirements imposed 
by the Indian Civil Rights Act). 
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B.    Noninterference of State Law 
In two early cases, United States v. McBratney500 and Draper v. United 
States,501 the Supreme Court found that a federal reservation of land 
for Indian tribes did not remove the power of states to punish crimes 
committed between two non-Indians, because state jurisdiction in that 
limited instance did not interfere with the purpose of the reservation.502  
For federal reservations of all types, Justice Van Devanter laid out the 
broader principle in Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States.503  It is a 
general rule of non-interference with the established purpose of any 
federal lands:  “True, for many purposes a State has civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over lands within its limits belonging to the United States, 
but this jurisdiction does not extend to any matter that is not consistent 
with full power in the United States to protect its lands, to control their 
use, and to prescribe in what manner others may acquire rights in 
them.”504  The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed this principle.505 
State jurisdiction on any federal land exists only to the extent that it does 
not interfere with the federal purpose of the reservation, or with federal 
legislation.506  If it is an Indian reservation, state jurisdiction should exist 
only to the degree that it does not interfere with tribal self-government. 
This is a more administrable standard than those that have 
developed in the last fifty years.  For example, in White Mountain v. 
Bracker,507 the Supreme Court considered the issue of state taxes on 
tribal land.  The Court looked at the issues through the lens of the 
Commerce Clause, established a balancing test—a “fact specific 
inquiry” into the relative state, tribal and federal interests, where 
interference with tribal self-government is permissible as long as state 
interests are deemed more compelling.508  This fact-specific balancing 
                                               
 500. 104 U.S. 621 (1881). 
 501. 164 U.S. 240 (1896). 
 502. See Draper, 164 U.S. at 244–45, 247 (stating that the rule of “equality of 
statehood” compels that federal reservations cannot deprive a state of such power); 
McBratney, 104 U.S. at 623–24 (observing that Colorado’s enabling act included no 
provision allowing a federal reservation to infringe the state’s authority over non-
Indians within the federal reservation). 
 503. 243 U.S. 389 (1917). 
 504. Id. at 404. 
 505. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976); United States v. 
California, 332 U.S. 19, 33–35 (1947); United States v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 
310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940); McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922). 
 506. Utah Power & Light Co., 243 U.S. at 404. 
 507. 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
 508. Id. at 144–45. 
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test and its inconsistent application provide strong incentives for state 
and local governments to assert tax jurisdiction in Indian country and 
litigate any challenges.  The Bracker decision creates great business 
uncertainty, undermines tribal self-government and drives economic 
development and tax revenue away from Indian country.509 
In contrast, the Territory Clause provides a straightforward rule of 
non-interference with the purposes of an Indian reservation, or with 
any federal law.  This principle was well stated in the landmark decision 
of Williams v. Lee510 in 1959:  “Essentially, absent governing Acts of 
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action 
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws 
and be ruled by them.”511  Williams relies on Territory Clause decisions 
for this proposition.512  Viewed through the lens of the Territory 
Clause, state jurisdiction should exist only to the degree that it does 
not interfere with tribal self-government and the tribe’s ability to 
provide for its citizens.  For Indian country and the federal courts, this 
is a more justiciable standard.513 
C.    Reconsideration of Kagama 
The source of the Plenary Power Doctrine is traced to the Supreme 
Court’s 1886 decision in United States v. Kagama, upholding the Major 
Crimes Act’s extension of federal jurisdiction to certain felony crimes 
                                               
 509. See Kelly Croman & Jonathan Taylor, Why Beggar thy Indian Neighbor? The Case 
for Tribal Primacy in Taxation in Indian Country, JOINT OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON NATIVE 
AFFAIRS 1, 8 (May 4, 2016), http://nni.arizona.edu/application/files/8914/6254/ 
9090/2016_Croman_why_beggar_thy_Indian_neighbor.pdf (arguing that the Court’s 
decision created an unpredictable situation where a fact-specific balancing test of federal and 
tribal interests are weighed against state interests leading to uncertain tax policies). 
 510. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
 511. Id. at 220. 
 512. See id. at 218–20.  Here, the Court cites Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), 
where the Court rejected Georgia’s enforcement of state statutes against the Cherokee 
nation.  See Williams, 358 U.S. at 218–19.  The Court asserted that such reservations 
were distinct communities subject only to treaties made between them and the U.S. 
government.  See id. at 219.  This ruling has only been modified over the years where 
state action would not affect tribal relations or the right of the tribes to govern 
themselves.  Id. at 219–20. 
 513. In Oneida Tribe v. Village of Hobart, Judge Posner draws an important distinction 
between state taxes in Indian country, which should be forbidden, and fees for 
governmental services, which are not.  See 732 F.3d 837, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2013).  This 
distinction would be useful in ameliorating any consequences of a shift away from 
Bracker balancing. 
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committed by Indians.514  Kagama is widely criticized for its bare 
assertion of federal power over Indian people:  “It must exist in that 
government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the 
theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United 
States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can 
enforce its laws on all the tribes.”515  However, neither the courts nor 
legal scholars have reflected on the role of tribal lands and the 
Territory Clause within the decision. 
Kagama should be reconsidered for two reasons:  one internal and one 
external to the Court’s reasoning.  First, apart from its broadly stated 
conclusion, the bulk of the opinion wrestles with a question long settled.  
Kagama’s rejection of federal Article IV authority as inapplicable after 
statehood is no longer good law.516  Professor Peter Appel has written 
forcefully about the disappearance of the Territory Clause from late 
nineteenth Century jurisprudence, tracing it to Dred Scott v. Sanford and 
the struggle over the prohibition on slavery found in the Northwest 
Ordinance.517  He also detailed the broad revival of the Territory Clause 
since that time, where the Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified that it 
continues in force after statehood.518  The Kagama decision is a relic of its 
era in many ways, and there are good reasons to revisit its reasoning. 
Second, the Kagama decision had a stealthier purpose.  Nine months 
before the Kagama was issued, the New York Times editorialized in favor of 
the General Allotment Act, “In short, the flimsy theory of tribal sovereignty 
should be extirpated, the reservation system replaced by fee-simple grants 
in severalty, the surplus land opened to white settlement, and the Indians 
placed under the restraint and protection of ordinary and impartial laws, 
with a view of making them self-reliant and self-supporting.”519 
                                               
 514. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 375–77, 385 (1886). 
 515. Id. at 384–85. 
 516. Id. at 380 (finding the power “not so much from the clause in the Constitution 
in regard to disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning the territory 
and other property of the United States, as from the ownership of the country in which 
the territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the 
national government, and can be found nowhere else”). 
 517. See Appel, supra note 433, at 44–46. 
 518. Id. at 93–94.  Professor Appel’s article is a touchstone legal analysis of the 
Territory Clause.  His article did not consider the role of Indian tribes and tribal lands 
in the history of the Northwest Ordinance and the Territory Clause, or limitations on 
federal power that may arise from trust ownership of land. 
 519. The Century, The Indian Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1885, https://times 
machine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1885/08/09/109310997.pdf. 
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The Kagama decision arrived in the middle of Congress’s sweeping 
debate on the General Allotment Act.520  Congress seized on the 
plenary authority of the Kagama decision, and the General Allotment 
Act was signed into law in February of 1887.521  The Kagama decision 
provided Congress with plenary power to justify taking Indian land 
absent tribal consent.”522  This purpose has been disavowed by 
Congress and, similar to the Dred Scott decision, should be removed 
from consideration as Supreme Court precedent. 
D.    Congressional Authority for Expansion of  
Tribal Jurisdiction over Crime 
In 2013, Congress responded to over a decade of advocacy from 
tribal leaders, Native women’s organizations, and many others who 
demanded action to address domestic violence on Indian 
reservations.523  In reauthorizing the Violence Against Women Act, 
Congress included amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act that 
restored tribal government criminal jurisdiction over domestic 
violence committed by non-Indian defendants.524  The new law affirms 
the inherent authority of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over all persons committing certain crimes within “Indian country,” 
while guaranteeing rights to due process and habeas review.525  The law 
alters the Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant, which held that tribal 
government criminal jurisdiction did not extend to non-Indians, 
absent further clarification from Congress.526  After five years of 
                                               
 520. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559–60, n.9 (1981) (discussing the 
congressional debate regarding the allotments). 
 521. See Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). 
 522. The Century, supra note 519. 
 523. See generally National Congress of American Indians, VAWA’S 2013 SPECIAL 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION FIVE-YEAR REPORT (2018), http://www. 
ncai.org/resources/ncai-publications/SDVCJ_5_Year_Report.pdf. 
 524. 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. I 2013). 
 525. See § 1304(b)(1) (providing that “the powers of self-government of a 
participating tribe include the inherent power of that tribe . . . to exercise special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons”); see also § 1303 (authorizing 
the use of habeas corpus by “any person, in a court of the United States, to test the 
legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe”). 
 526. 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
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implementation, there are now eighteen Indian tribes implementing 
the law with significant success for public safety.527 
Territory Clause analysis demonstrates a strong source of legislative 
authority for Congress to enact this law, and to address future 
questions of public safety and tribal criminal jurisdiction.  Congress 
can build on the original purpose of the Territory Clause:  to 
harmonize the existence of non-Indians within tribal self-governing 
territory, by regulating both non-Indians who threaten the peace and 
the manner in which Indian tribes exercise their inherent local powers. 
CONCLUSION—PRINCIPLES TO ACCOMPANY THE FEDERAL TRUST 
OBLIGATION TO INDIAN LANDS 
The Proclamation of 1763 declared British dominion over tribal 
lands from the eastern shore of North America to the Mississippi, 
asserting a right of pre-emption in tribally owned lands, a system for 
regulation of trade, and jurisdiction over fugitive criminals.528  This was 
an assertion of dominion over territory intended to prevent violent 
conflict.  After the Revolutionary War, the United States found itself in 
a similar position, and replicated the British Indian policy. 
From our vantage point in the twenty-first century, there is a 
tendency to look back and view this as paternalism.  Perhaps it was, but 
the alternative was violent bedlam on the frontier.  Eighteenth century 
European settlers in America were incredibly ethnocentric, violent, 
and land hungry.  Jay, later our first Chief Justice, wrote to Jefferson in 
December 1786:  “Indians have been murdered by our People in cold 
Blood and no satisfaction given, nor are they pleased with the avidity 
with which we seek to acquire their Lands.”529  Jay labeled these 
frontiersmen “white Savages.”530  The purpose of the Territory Clause 
was to authorize the plan from the Northwest Ordinance, a plan for 
                                               
 527. See, e.g., SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION PILOT PROJECT 
REPORT, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS 2 (2015); Angela Riley, Crime and Governance in 
Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564, 1595 (2016). 
 528. Proclamation Line of 1763, Quebec Act of 1774 and Westward Expansion, OFFICE OF 
THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1750-1775/proclamation-line-
1763 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 529. Letter to Thomas Jefferson from John Jay, (Dec. 14, 1786), FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0457 (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 530. Id. 
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consensual purchase of tribal lands, and orderly settlement of new 
states along the western frontier.531 
This was the original intent, but the United States did not keep the 
Framers’ promise of good faith.  Settlers and speculators continued to 
invade tribal lands, violence and war ensued, and after the hostilities, 
the United States used threats and intimidation to gain even greater 
cessions.532  This cycle repeated itself throughout the nineteenth 
century as the United States grew in military strength.533  Congress 
enacted laws to take tribal lands and undermine tribal languages, 
cultures and existence, and the Supreme Court wrote decisions to 
justify these actions.534  These decisions were products of their times, 
and legal scholars will not summon an impossible coherence out of the 
Court’s plenary power jurisprudence. 
Even with the terrible losses, the remaining tribal lands have survived 
as a bulwark against annihilation of tribal sovereignty and tribal cultures.  
Tribal lands remain the center of indigenous civilizations in the United 
States, the places where the elders pass on culture, languages and 
traditions to succeeding generations.  They are the places where tribal 
governments make their own laws, run their own schools, and have 
become important sources of economic development and jobs in their 
regions.535  President Nixon’s Special Message to Congress heralded the 
era of tribal self-determination, and the federal government has not 
attempted to take tribal lands or undermine tribal governments since that 
time.536  Instead, Congress has enacted laws that expand tribal self-
government.537  Congress has both historic obligations and contemporary 
                                               
 531. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 532. See supra notes 171–185 and accompanying text. 
 533. ROBERT MARSHALL UTLEY & WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN WARS 130–31, 147–48 (1977) (highlighting the struggles of 
Tecumseh and other 19th century Indian leaders to prevent U.S. westward expansion). 
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reasons to protect tribal lands, affirm tribal sovereign authorities, and 
prevent interference with the tribal self-determination era. 
In this era, federal courts are demanding closer adherence to the 
text of the Constitution. Further solutions to the problems in Indian 
country are likely to be legislative or will depend on principled 
application of existing laws that protect tribal lands and rights.  In this 
time it is also reasonable to expect that good faith will be observed and 
laws will be made for preventing wrongs and preserving peace and 
friendship with Indian tribes.  Washington’s Indian policy, framed in 
the Territory Clause and the Northwest Ordinance, may find greater 
acceptance in the twenty-first century, than in the nineteenth. 
The federal government has asserted and held territorial jurisdiction in 
Indian country since the framing of the Constitution.  Since that time, it has 
become embedded in the federal land title system at the Department of 
Interior, in federal criminal jurisdiction administered by the Department 
of Justice, and in many federal court decisions.  Understanding the 
Framer’s intentions brings coherence to federal Indian law, and empowers 
Congress and tribal governments to work together to protect public safety 
and to advance the goals of tribal self-determination. 
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